
Adversarial image attacks on vision-language web agents, from visual grounding to browser execution
Adversarial Images Hijack Web Agents from Visual Grounding to Browser Execution
Wanjing Han, Levi Taiji Li, Mu Zhang, Yue Jiang, Guanhong Tao — University of Utah
WebMirage is a red-teaming framework for vision-grounded web agents. It crafts localized adversarial perturbations on attacker-controlled webpage images (e.g., a product thumbnail or a profile photo) that cause the agent to select the attacker's element and execute the corresponding browser action, across varying webpage renderings. The attack is formulated end-to-end, from visual grounding to browser execution, rather than at model inference alone.
Two components make this work:
The framework is evaluated against SeeAct and VisualWebArena agents across six VLM backbones (LLaVA, MiniCPM-o, Phi-3 Vision, and others). See the paper for the full evaluation.
.
├── src/ # Perturbation optimization, one subdirectory per backbone
│ ├── LLaVA/
│ ├── MiniCPM-o/
│ └── Phi-3-vision/
├── scripts/ # Training / evaluation launch scripts, one subdirectory per backbone
├── dataflow/ # CodeQL query pack for agent dataflow analysis (DataflowAnalysis.ql)
├── data/ # Recomposed training / test screenshots and conversation templates
└── test/ # Pre-generated clean and perturbed samples for quick verification
The base models must be set up manually before using this framework.
Because the backbones have conflicting library requirements, each needs its own environment and locally downloaded weights.
conda create -n minicpm), and install dependencies.conda create -n llava).transformers version in a dedicated environment.Phi-3-vision-128k-instruct weights locally.A minimal test runs inference on both clean and perturbed screenshots and compares the agent's selections side by side.
Note: This test requires Phi-3 Vision (see Prerequisites §3). The provided perturbed images were optimized for Phi-3; test data for other backbones can be generated with the training scripts in
scripts/.
Pre-generated test cases are located in test/:
test/
├── clean_fix_slot/ # Clean screenshots, target in a fixed slot position
├── clean_multi_slot/ # Clean screenshots, target across multiple slot positions
├── perturbed_fix_slot/ # Perturbed screenshots (ε=16/255), target in a fixed slot
├── perturbed_multi_slot/ # Perturbed screenshots (ε=16/255), target across multiple slots
├── conv.json # Conversation data (system prompt, user query, grounding prompt)
└── verify.py # Runs inference on clean vs. perturbed and compares results
The fix_slot cases test companion variation (target position fixed, surrounding elements vary); the multi_slot cases test companion variation and positional shift simultaneously.
conda activate phi3vision
# Fixed slot position
python test/verify.py \
--model-path /path/to/Phi-3-vision-128k-instruct \
--conv-path test/conv.json \
--clean-image test/clean_fix_slot/sample_0.png \
--perturbed-image test/perturbed_fix_slot/sample_0.png
# Varying slot positions
python test/verify.py \
--model-path /path/to/Phi-3-vision-128k-instruct \
--conv-path test/conv.json \
--clean-image test/clean_multi_slot/sample_0.png \
--perturbed-image test/perturbed_multi_slot/sample_0.png
The script prints a comparison table showing, for each test case, the element selected under clean vs. perturbed input. On clean screenshots the agent should select the best-matching candidate; on perturbed screenshots it should consistently select the attacker-controlled candidate.
With a dedicated Conda environment for each backbone in place, the workflow below uses LLaVA as the example.
The scripts reference the official LLaVA code from your home directory (~/):
cd ~
git clone https://github.com/haotian-liu/LLaVA.git
Open scripts/LLaVA/train_with_mask.sh and set each path (model weights, training data, conversation template, mask, output directory) to match your local setup.
bash scripts/LLaVA/train_with_mask.sh
Training data lives under data/<scenario>/, with recomposed screenshots and a train_samples.json conversation file. The image-token placeholder in the conversation file must match the target backbone:
| Backbone | Placeholder |
|---|---|
| MiniCPM-o | ()\n |
| LLaVA | <image>\n |
| Phi-3 | <|image_1|>\n |
End-to-end evaluation requires the target agent frameworks.
scripts/seeact/.scripts/visualwebarena/ for evaluation scripts with both Accessibility Tree and Set-of-Mark observation modes.dataflow/DataflowAnalysis.ql is the CodeQL query used to trace which model-output tokens flow into the executed browser action in an agent's post-processing code. Run it against the target agent's source with the CodeQL CLI using the pack definition in dataflow/codeql-pack.yml.
All public-website experiments in the paper use client-side asset replacement: adversarial images are substituted in the agent's local browser view only, and no content is uploaded to or modified on any third-party site. Please use this framework for defensive research only.
@article{han2026webmirage,
title = {Adversarial Images Hijack Web Agents from Visual Grounding to Browser Execution},
author = {Han, Wanjing and Li, Levi Taiji and Zhang, Mu and Jiang, Yue and Tao, Guanhong},
journal = {arXiv preprint arXiv:XXXX.XXXXX},
year = {2026}
}
MIT. See LICENSE.