
Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-24514, a memory exhaustion denial-of-service in ingress-nginx validating admission webhook, allowing low-privileged attackers to crash controller pods via oversized AdmissionReview requests.
Unauthenticated / low-privileged remote denial-of-service vulnerability allowing attackers to crash ingress-nginx controller pods via oversized AdmissionReview requests.
The ingress-nginx validating admission webhook (when enabled) does not enforce reasonable limits on the size of incoming AdmissionReview objects.
An attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint — even with only low privileges — can submit extremely large JSON payloads, forcing the controller process to allocate massive amounts of memory.
Consequences include:
CVSS v3.1 Base Score
6.5 Medium
Vector String
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Credits
Mohammed Idrees Banyamer – @banyamer_security (Jordan)
| Component | Vulnerable Versions | Fixed Versions | Webhook Enabled By Default? |
|---|---|---|---|
| ingress-nginx | < 1.13.7 | ≥ 1.13.7 | No |
| ingress-nginx (1.14.x) | < 1.14.3 | ≥ 1.14.3 | No |
Note: The vulnerability only manifests when the validating admission webhook feature is explicitly enabled.
sequenceDiagram
participant Attacker as Low-priv. Attacker<br>(inside / adjacent cluster)
participant API as kube-apiserver
participant WebhookConfig as ValidatingWebhookConfiguration<br>(ingress-nginx-admission)
participant AdmissionSvc as ingress-nginx-admission<br>Service / Pod
participant Controller as ingress-nginx Controller Process
Note over Attacker,Controller: Attack prerequisites: webhook enabled + reachable endpoint
Attacker->>API: 1. Create/Update large Ingress resource<br>OR direct POST to webhook endpoint
API->>WebhookConfig: 2. Trigger admission review
WebhookConfig->>AdmissionSvc: 3. Forward AdmissionReview v1 request<br>(very large JSON body)
AdmissionSvc->>Controller: 4. Receive & begin parsing huge payload
activate Controller
Note right of Controller: No request body size limit in vulnerable versions
Controller-->>Controller: 5. Allocate memory for large strings/objects<br>(heap grows massively → OOM imminent)
Controller->>AdmissionSvc: 6. (Fails / hangs due to memory exhaustion)
deactivate Controller
Kubernetes->>AdmissionSvc: 7. kubelet detects memory limit breach
Kubernetes->>AdmissionSvc: 8. OOMKill container
AdmissionSvc-->>API: 9. Webhook timeout / connection refused
API-->>Attacker: 10. Admission denied or timeout<br>(Ingress creation fails)
Note over Attacker,Kubernetes: Result:
Note over Attacker,Kubernetes: • ingress-nginx pod restarted / crashed
Note over Attacker,Kubernetes: • Temporary loss of ingress validation
Note over Attacker,Kubernetes: • Potential brief service disruption for new ingresses
Note over Attacker,Kubernetes: • Possible node pressure in low-memory clusters
Important: This vulnerability should only be demonstrated in isolated lab/test clusters with explicit permission.
Running this against production environments is illegal and may cause outages.
Recommended safe testing method:
# 1. Port-forward the admission service locally
kubectl port-forward svc/ingress-nginx-controller-admission \
8443:443 -n ingress-nginx
# 2. Run PoC with increasing payload sizes (start small!)
python3 cve-2026-24514-Kubernetes.py https://localhost:8443/validate 25 --insecure
# 3. Monitor memory & pod status in another terminal
watch -n 2 'kubectl top pods -n ingress-nginx && kubectl get pods -n ingress-nginx'
# More aggressive examples (use with caution)
python3 cve-2026-24514-Kubernetes.py https://localhost:8443/validate 80 --insecure
python3 cve-2026-24514-Kubernetes.py https://localhost:8443/validate 150 --insecure --field-name enormousJunk
Realistic attack scenarios:
--enable-validating-webhook=false)Responsible disclosure & PoC credit: Mohammed Idrees Banyamer (@banyamer_security)