kyxiaxiang/360wfp_exploitBYOVD: Use 360 WFP driver to block EDR/XDR network connection.
A proof-of-concept (PoC) demonstrating potential abuse of the 360 Security WFP driver (360netmon_x64_wfp.sys) interface, aimed at verifying the risk that IOCTL interfaces without caller authentication may be misused by third-party programs.
This project is intended for security research and vulnerability analysis only. It must not be used for any illegal purposes.
During reverse engineering of the 360 Security network monitoring driver 360netmon_x64_wfp.sys, the following behaviors were discovered:
The driver exposes two device objects to user mode:
\\.\360TdiFilter\\.\360TdiSpeedThese device objects can be accessed by any administrator-level process via DeviceIoControl
The IrpMjDeviceControl handler performs no caller identity or signature verification
Certain IOCTL functions can be directly used to:
This repository provides a minimal PoC to demonstrate:
How a process running on a system with 360 Security installed can block network access of any specified process using legitimate driver interfaces.
At the entry point of the driver’s IrpMjDeviceControl routine, only the device object is validated:
cmp rdi, g_pDeviceObject_TdiFilter
jz ...
No caller privilege validation or source authentication is performed at all.
As a result, any administrator-privileged process can:
0x220804 to configure process network throttling or blocking0x220444 to dynamically modify WFP filtering rulesThis PoC implements the following operations:
\\.\360TdiFilter0x220804 to set a target process into “fully block network” modeResult:
Open the project in Visual Studio and build:
x64 Release
360WFP_Exploit.exe "C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe"
After execution, the target process will immediately lose all network connectivity.
.
├── src/
│ ├── main.c // PoC main logic
│ ├── driver_io.c // IOCTL invocation wrapper
│ └── utils.c // helper functions (e.g., path conversion)
├── README.md
└── LICENSE
Core data structure expected by the driver:
typedef struct _PACK {
WCHAR szNtPath[MAX_PATH + 40];
WCHAR szPath[MAX_PATH];
BOOL bCancelFlag;
LONGLONG qwBlockCnnt;
LONGLONG nLimitSend;
LONGLONG nLimitRecv;
DWORD dwZeroCheck;
} PACK, *PPACK;
When:
qwBlockCnnt = LLONG_MAX
the driver returns in the WFP Callout:
FWP_ACTION_BLOCK
which results in complete network blocking for the target process.
一个针对 360 安全卫士 WFP 驱动（360netmon_x64_wfp.sys）的接口滥用演示 PoC，用于验证驱动 IOCTL 接口在未进行调用者身份校验情况下，可能被第三方程序滥用的问题。
本项目仅用于安全研究与漏洞分析演示，不用于任何非法用途。
在对 360 安全卫士网络监控驱动 360netmon_x64_wfp.sys 的逆向分析过程中发现：
驱动向用户态暴露了两个设备对象：
\\.\360TdiFilter\\.\360TdiSpeed这些设备对象允许普通管理员进程通过 DeviceIoControl 发送 IOCTL 请求
IrpMjDeviceControl 中没有对调用者进行任何身份或签名验证
部分 IOCTL 功能可以被直接用于：
本仓库提供了一个最小化 PoC，用于演示：
在已安装 360 安全卫士的系统上，如何通过合法接口阻断任意指定进程的网络访问。
驱动的 IrpMjDeviceControl 入口处仅验证设备对象是否匹配：
cmp rdi, g_pDeviceObject_TdiFilter
jz ...
完全没有进行调用者权限校验或来源验证。
因此，任何具有管理员权限的进程，都可以：
0x220804 设置进程网络限速/阻断0x220444 动态修改 WFP 过滤规则本 PoC 实现了：
\\.\360TdiFilter 设备0x220804 将目标进程设置为“完全阻断网络”模式效果：
使用 Visual Studio 打开项目并编译：
x64 Release
360WFP_Exploit.exe "C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe"
执行后，目标进程将被立即阻断网络访问。
.
├── src/
│ ├── main.c // PoC 主逻辑
│ ├── driver_io.c // IOCTL 调用封装
│ └── utils.c // 路径转换等辅助函数
├── README.md
└── LICENSE
驱动期望的核心数据结构：
typedef struct _PACK {
WCHAR szNtPath[MAX_PATH + 40];
WCHAR szPath[MAX_PATH];
BOOL bCancelFlag;
LONGLONG qwBlockCnnt;
LONGLONG nLimitSend;
LONGLONG nLimitRecv;
DWORD dwZeroCheck;
} PACK, *PPACK;
当：
qwBlockCnnt = LLONG_MAX
时，驱动会在 WFP Callout 中直接返回：
FWP_ACTION_BLOCK
从而彻底阻断目标进程的网络通信。