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CVE-2026-16444 — Technical write-up of CVE-2026-16444, a path traversal in TeamViewer Classical File Transfer that lets a controlled endpoint write arbitrary files on the controller's machine. | Kitploit
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CVE-2026-16444

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Technical write-up of CVE-2026-16444, a path traversal in TeamViewer Classical File Transfer that lets a controlled endpoint write arbitrary files on the controller's machine.

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Breaking the Wrong Way Down a Support Session

Arbitrary File Write on the Controller via TeamViewer Classical File Transfer

CVE-2026-16444 · TeamViewer Security Bulletin TV-2026-1008

Jamir0quai Published 5 October 2026


Abstract

TeamViewer's Classical File Transfer applied its filename character validator to one direction of a transfer and not the other. A machine being supported could therefore rewrite the name of a file that the supporting technician chose to pull, embedding forward-slash traversal sequences that escaped the technician's download folder. The file landed wherever the compromised machine chose to put it — anywhere the technician's own account could write — with the transfer reported as ordinary and successful.

The interesting property is not the traversal but its direction. Remote support tooling is built on an implicit assumption that the controller holds authority over the controlled machine, and the security controls on the file transfer surface were arranged accordingly. This issue runs the other way. It lets an already-compromised endpoint reach back down the support session and obtain persistent code execution on the administrator's workstation, in the administrator's user context, during the very session opened to clean the endpoint up.

This paper documents the vulnerability as analysed and reported, the negative results that located the boundary of the bug, the severity discussion with the vendor, and the design lesson — which is about where validation lives, not about whether it existed.


Vulnerability summary

CVECVE-2026-16444
Vendor bulletinTV-2026-1008, published 26 August 2026
VendorTeamViewer SE
Affected productsTeamViewer Remote, TeamViewer Tensor, TeamViewer ONE (Full Client, Host, QuickSupport, Portable)
Version analysedTeamViewer Full Client for Windows 15.76.5.0 x64
Installer SHA-25664b50dbdfdcc362aa2448fb88e9f56bfc28211a84ecc7744d7dd744d7ec7e56f
Fixed versions15.81.5+ · legacy Windows 7/8 15.64.7+ · v14 14.7.48833 (Win) / 14.7.48838 (Linux, macOS) · v13 13.2.36229+ (Win) / 13.2.153978+ (Linux, macOS)
WeaknessVendor classification CWE-73, External Control of File Name or Path. The mechanism analysed here is more precisely CWE-22, Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory.
SeverityCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — 7.5 High, as agreed with the vendor
CreditThe bulletin credits Jamir0quai and sam91281 via TeamViewer's bug bounty programme. This paper describes only the author's own report and the Classical File Transfer vector it covered.
Scope noteThe vendor's advisory also cites the virtual file clipboard as an affected mechanism. That vector is outside the analysis presented here and is not claimed.

1. Background: two peers, two receive paths

Classical File Transfer moves files in both directions within a session. Either peer can act as the sender. That symmetry in the feature produces two distinct receiving implementations inside the client, and the vulnerability lives in the difference between them.

On the receiving side, a TransferNewFile protocol message carries the filename supplied by the sending peer. The receiver parses it into path components, keeps the final component as the filename, appends it to the download root the user selected, and hands the composed path to CreateFileW by way of:

CopyFilesOperationIncoming::HandleIncomingTransferNewFile
    └── FileDataSinkFileListWin::CreateFileInternal
            └── CreateFileW

The client does own a filename validator suitable for this job. It builds a 256-byte lookup table of illegal characters and rejects any component containing a control character, <, >, :, ", |, backslash 0x5C, or forward slash 0x2F.

The developers clearly anticipated path injection. Both separator characters are on the deny list, and the component parser handles a standalone dot-dot as a special case rather than by accident. This was not an oversight of analysis. It was an oversight of coverage.

2. The bug: the validator is not on both paths

The validator is reached when the local side processes outgoing and locally originated paths, and when the controlled peer receives a file pushed to it. It is not reached on the path that handles a file the controller has pulled from the remote peer. In that direction the last path component travels from the protocol message, through path composition, and on to CreateFileW without ever being tested against the character table.

Nothing downstream catches it either:

  • no canonicalisation before the open;
  • no lexically_normal;
  • no comparison of the resolved path against the download root;
  • no rejection of absolute or UNC forms.

The six GetFullPathNameW call sites in the binary sit in directory-enumeration helpers and path utilities rather than in the receive-and-write chain. The character validator was the only defence on this surface, so its absence on one path left that path with no defence at all.

The result is that a filename of the form:

../../Public/pwn.bat

arriving from the remote peer, is concatenated onto:

C:\Users\<technician>\Downloads\

and resolved by the Windows path API to:

C:\Users\Public\pwn.bat

Windows accepts forward slashes as separators, so the traversal never needs a character the validator would have objected to — had it been asked.

2.1 Negative results

Two earlier attempts are worth recording, because they show where the boundary actually sits.

Backslashes in a single component are rejected. Replacing the filename with one component containing \ is caught correctly. This is the validator doing exactly what it was written to do, on a path where it is invoked.

Traversal split across components is discarded. Supplying separate .. components is ineffective, because the receiver keeps only the last component and throws the rest away.

Only slashes embedded inside that final surviving component reach the filesystem API with their meaning intact. The bug is narrower than "the filename is unvalidated" and the precise shape matters for anyone reproducing it.

3. Demonstration

The proof of concept was built on a two-machine rig: a Windows 11 controller running the affected TeamViewer version, and a Linux machine standing in for the compromised endpoint.

The Linux side simulates an attacker who already holds code execution there — which is the premise of the whole scenario — by instrumenting its own TeamViewer client so that the outgoing filename in the transfer message differs from the file's real name on disk. The rewrite is performed in place and byte for byte, because the protocol framing is length-prefixed and a size change corrupts it. Nothing on the controller is touched or modified.

The technician then does something entirely ordinary. They open file transfer, browse the remote machine, select a file, and click receive with their Downloads folder as the destination.

The file that arrives is not in Downloads. It is at the attacker's chosen path — and the client's own event log on the controller records the traversal destination verbatim, which is a useful confirmation that the application processed the path, rather than the filesystem silently resolving something unintended.

Two destinations were demonstrated:

  1. C:\Users\Public\ — establishes that the download root can be escaped at all.
  2. The user's Startup folder, reached by a slightly longer traversal string — turns the write into code execution in the technician's context on their next logon, with no further interaction from anybody.
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