Automated DLL Hijacking Discovery, Validation, and Confirmation. Turning local misconfigurations into weaponized, confirmed attack paths.
Automated DLL hijacking discovery, validation, and confirmation for Windows
From "this DLL might be hijackable" to "a standard user can make SYSTEM load this — here is the proof."
DLLHijackHunter finds DLL hijacking opportunities on a Windows host and works to prove them, not just list them. It:
Every judgement is made from the attacker's point of view — an unprivileged standard user — regardless of whether the scanner itself runs elevated. Running as Administrator gives the tool more visibility (ETW, canary, service triggers); it never makes protected directories look writable or inflates the privilege gained.
Download or build DLLHijackHunter.exe (self-contained; no .NET install needed), then from an elevated prompt:
# Passive, read-only triage: no file drops, no service/task starts
.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile safe
# Full static analysis without touching the system, JSON report
.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile aggressive --no-canary --no-etw -o report.json
# Static analysis + real-loader verification (writes probe DLLs transiently)
.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile aggressive --no-canary --no-etw --verify-load -o report.html
# Everything, including ETW and canary confirmation — lab / authorised targets only
.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile aggressive -o report.html
# Focus on one application
.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --target "C:\Program Files\MyApp\app.exe" --no-canary
Antivirus: the canary and probe DLLs are unsigned and behave like hijack payloads, so Microsoft Defender may quarantine them. The tool detects this and reports those results as inconclusive rather than "not hijackable". On a test machine, exclude the target directories and
%ProgramData%\DLLHijackHunterto get definitive results.
flowchart TB
subgraph S1["1 · Discovery"]
direction LR
EN["Launch points<br/>services · tasks · Run keys<br/>startup · COM · AutoElevate"] --> PE["PE analysis<br/>imports · delay loads<br/>manifest"] --> SO["Search order<br/>identity-aware PATH"]
ETW["ETW runtime trace<br/>optional, elevated"]
end
subgraph S2["2 · Filter pipeline"]
direction LR
HG["Hard gates<br/>API sets · KnownDLLs<br/>writability"] --> SG["Soft gates<br/>manifest · privilege<br/>PPL · LoadLibraryEx"] --> DD["Dedup and<br/>profile filters"]
end
subgraph S3["3 · Verification (optional)"]
direction LR
LP["Load probe<br/>real Windows loader"] --> CN["Canary<br/>deploy, trigger, confirm"]
end
subgraph S4["4 · Output"]
direction LR
SC["Scoring and tiers"] --> AC["Attack chains"] --> RP["Console · JSON · HTML"]
end
S1 --> S2 --> S3 --> S4
| Phase | Requires admin | Modifies the system |
|---|---|---|
| Static discovery + filters | No (admin sees more) | No |
| ETW runtime discovery | Yes | Starts auto-start services (up to 100) and runs scheduled tasks (up to 30) to provoke DLL loads |
Load probe (--verify-load) | No | Briefly writes a benign probe DLL at each candidate position, then removes it and restores any original |
| Canary confirmation | Yes | Writes a canary DLL, stops/starts services, runs tasks, activates COM objects, then cleans up |
| Type | What it means | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Phantom | The DLL does not exist anywhere in the search path | Plant it anywhere the binary searches |
| Search order | A writable directory is searched before the legitimate copy | Includes overwriting a DLL in a writable directory |
| ENV PATH | A writable directory in PATH is searched for a missing DLL | Services are evaluated against the machine PATH only — the user's own PATH entries are never searched by a service |
| .local redirect | <app>.exe.local\<dll> redirection | Only reported for executables without a manifest (or when IFEO DevOverrideEnable=1); the loader ignores .local otherwise, and it never redirects KnownDLLs |
| Side-load (UAC) | Copy an auto-elevating EXE next to a planted DLL | Only for EXEs with <autoElevate>true</autoElevate> in their manifest. Auto-elevation requires a trusted location, so the copy must pass that check (e.g. a mock C:\Windows \System32\ folder) |
| AppInit DLLs | AppInit_DLLs points to a writable DLL | Loaded into every process that loads user32.dll |
| AppCert DLLs | AppCertDLLs points to a writable DLL | Loaded into every CreateProcess/WinExec caller |
IFEO Debugger and SilentProcessExit\MonitorProcess binaries are enumerated and analysed like any other launch point. CWD-based hijacks are not currently produced.
Correct identity drives both the privilege-escalation verdict and the impact score:
ObjectName (LocalSystem, Local Service, Network Service, or an account); svchost services also analyse their ServiceDll.S-1-5-18 are mapped to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM; group principals run as the logged-on member (only Administrators + highest privileges counts as elevated). Payloads wrapped in rundll32, cmd /c, or powershell -File are analysed too.HKEY_USERS) and every profile's Startup folder, attributed to that user — not just the account running the scanner.AppID → RunAs / LocalService; in-process servers run as whichever client loads them.