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CVE-2026-4567-Post-Quantum-KEM-Timing-Side-Channel-Kyber-Decapsulation- | Kitploit
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CVE-2026-4567-Post-Quantum-KEM-Timing-Side-Channel-Kyber-Decapsulation-

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17 days agoNot yet reviewed

2. CVE-2026-4567 – Post-Quantum KEM Timing Side-Channel (Kyber Decapsulation)

Overview

A vulnerable implementation of the Kyber KEM decapsulation leaks secret key bits through timing differences in the ciphertext rejection step, enabling full key recovery.

Severity: Critical (Private Key Compromise)

Vulnerable Server (C) & Attack Script (Python)

root@kitploit:~
// kyber_vuln_decaps.c - Simulated vulnerable Kyber decapsulation
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <time.h>

// Secret key (simplified, 16 bytes for demo)
static uint8_t secret_key[16] = {
    0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
    0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88
};

// Vulnerable decapsulation: processes ciphertext and returns shared secret
// but timing leaks bit-by-bit comparison of a re-encrypted value.
int vulnerable_decaps(uint8_t *ct, uint8_t *shared_secret_out) {
    // Simulate re-encryption: compare ct with a computed value byte by byte
    uint8_t re_enc[16];
    for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
        re_enc[i] = secret_key[i] ^ 0x55;  // dummy computation
    }
    // Timing leak: early exit on first mismatch
    for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
        if (ct[i] != re_enc[i]) {
            return -1;  // rejection, faster when mismatch early
        }
    }
    memcpy(shared_secret_out, secret_key, 16);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
    // simulate receiving a ciphertext (hardcoded for demo)
    uint8_t ct[16] = {0}; // attacker will probe
    uint8_t shared[16];
    int res = vulnerable_decaps(ct, shared);
    // Timing measured externally
    return 0;
}

CVE-2026-4567 – Kyber Decapsulation Timing Side-Channel

Severity: Critical CVE-2026-4567

📖 Overview

An implementation of the Kyber post‑quantum KEM fails to use constant‑time comparison during decapsulation. By measuring execution time of rejected ciphertexts, an attacker can iteratively recover the full private key.

⚙️ Vulnerability Details

  • Type: Timing Side-Channel
  • Impact: Full secret key recovery, breaking confidentiality of all past and future sessions.
  • Root Cause: The decapsulation routine compares a re‑encrypted value with the received ciphertext using a byte‑by‑byte loop that returns early on mismatch.
  • Real‑World Analog: Many cryptographic libraries had similar flaws in RSA/ECDSA before constant‑time fixes.

🧪 Exploit Demonstration

  1. Compile the vulnerable library:
    root@kitploit:~
    gcc -shared -o kyber_vuln.so -fPIC kyber_vuln_decaps.c
    
  2. Run the timing attack:
    root@kitploit:~
    python timing_attack.py
    
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