
Simulated Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) factory reset exploit for CVE-2026-21006, demonstrating unauthenticated TouchLink command injection that wipes device network keys and enables IoT device hijacking.
# zigbee_factory_reset.py - Simulated Zigbee coordinator sending factory reset command
import time
class ZigbeeDevice:
def __init__(self):
self.network_key = b'secret'
def receive_command(self, cmd_id):
if cmd_id == 0x00: # Factory Reset
print("Device factory reset! Network key cleared.")
self.network_key = None
device = ZigbeeDevice()
# Attacker sends a specially crafted ZLL touchlink command (simulated)
print("Sending TouchLink factory reset command...")
device.receive_command(0x00)
Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) devices support a factory reset via a TouchLink commissioning command that can be sent by any nearby ZLL controller. An attacker can force a device to reset, removing its network credentials and allowing take‑over.
Run the simulation:
python zigbee_factory_reset.py
The device erases its network key upon receiving the command.