CVE-2026-33453: CoAP Header Injection → Remote Code Execution

Component: camel-coap — CamelCoapResource.java:103-109 CWE: CWE-915 (Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Attributes) Fixed in: Camel 4.18.1 / 4.14.6

Root Cause

CamelCoapResource.handleRequest() maps CoAP URI query parameters directly into Camel Exchange headers via setHeader() with no HeaderFilterStrategy. CoAPEndpoint extends DefaultEndpoint instead of DefaultHeaderFilterStrategyEndpoint, so internal Camel*-prefixed headers can be injected by any unauthenticated client.

When the route forwards to camel-exec, the attacker-controlled CamelExecCommandExecutable and CamelExecCommandArgs headers override the configured command, achieving pre-authenticated RCE via a single UDP packet.

PoC Result

CVE-2026-40473: MINA Unsafe Deserialization → Remote Code Execution

Component: camel-mina — MinaConverter.java:60-63 CWE: CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data) Fixed in: Camel 4.18.2 / 4.14.6 / 4.20.0

Root Cause

MinaConverter.toObjectInput(IoBuffer) creates a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream with no ObjectInputFilter. When a MINA endpoint is configured with allowDefaultCodec=false, raw TCP data arrives as an IoBuffer and reaches Camel's type converter, which calls this method — wrapping attacker-controlled network bytes in an unfiltered ObjectInputStream.

Attack path: The exploit targets a MINA TCP endpoint with allowDefaultCodec=false (port 9879 in the PoC). This bypasses MINA's codec layer entirely — the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory has its own ClassNameMatcher allowlist that would otherwise block arbitrary classes. With the codec disabled, raw bytes flow straight to MinaConverter.toObjectInput() which creates a standard ObjectInputStream with zero class filtering.

A CommonsCollections6 gadget chain (via ysoserial) achieves arbitrary command execution as root. Command output is exfiltrated via a curl callback to the attacker.

PoC Result

Reproducing CVE-2026-40473 Step-by-Step

Prerequisites

• Docker and Docker Compose
• Python 3.8+
• Java 17+ (for ysoserial)
• ysoserial — ysoserial-all.jar (CommonsCollections6 gadget)

Step 1: Build and Start the Vulnerable Server

Wait for the container to start, then verify:

You should see:

Port 9879 is the target — it uses allowDefaultCodec=false, which disables MINA's codec filter and lets raw IoBuffer reach Camel's unfiltered MinaConverter.toObjectInput().

Step 2: Confirm Deserialization (Probe Mode)

First, verify that the endpoint accepts and deserializes arbitrary Java objects with no ObjectInputFilter:

The probe sends a serialized HashMap. The server deserializes it via ObjectInputStream.readObject() with no InvalidClassException — confirming zero class filtering.

Step 3: Execute Commands (Full RCE)

With ysoserial available, exploit the unfiltered deserialization for arbitrary command execution:

The exploit generates a CommonsCollections6 gadget chain, sends it as raw bytes to port 9879, and captures the command output via a curl callback listener.

Exploit Options

Note: The --callback-host defaults to host.docker.internal (Docker Desktop). If running on Linux without Docker Desktop, use --callback-host 172.17.0.1 or your Docker bridge IP.

Step 4: Cleanup

CVE-2026-40858: Infinispan Unsafe Deserialization

Component: camel-infinispan — DefaultExchangeHolderUtils.java:46-53 CWE: CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data) Fixed in: Camel 4.18.2 / 4.14.7 / 4.20.0

Root Cause

DefaultExchangeHolderUtils.deserialize(byte[]) creates a ClassLoadingAwareObjectInputStream with no ObjectInputFilter. The DefaultExchangeHolderProtoAdapter routes Infinispan cache bytes directly to this method. An attacker with cache write access (Hot Rod port 11222 or REST API) injects a malicious serialized payload that is deserialized when the aggregation repository fetches the key.

This is the same vulnerability pattern as CVE-2024-22369, CVE-2024-23114, and CVE-2026-25747 — all unfixed instances of readObject() without an ObjectInputFilter in Camel's deserialization paths.

Vulnerable Code

Annotated Vulnerable Code

Reproducing All Three CVEs

Prerequisites

• Docker and Docker Compose
• Python 3.8+
• Java 17+ (for ysoserial)
• ysoserial for full RCE gadget chains (CVE-2026-40473)

Build and Run

This starts:

• vuln-camel-coap — CoAP endpoint on UDP port 5683 with camel-exec route
• vuln-camel-mina — MINA TCP endpoints on ports 9877 (transferExchange), 9878 (ObjectSerializationCodecFactory), and 9879 (raw TCP — primary attack target)
• infinispan — Infinispan server on port 11222
• vuln-camel-infinispan — Camel aggregation repository backed by Infinispan

Run Exploits

Cleanup

Assessment Process

This assessment was performed using the RAPTOR autonomous security research framework:

1. Research — Identified all 3 CVEs, cross-referenced fix commits to determine Apache Camel 4.18.0 as the single vulnerable version
2. Source acquisition — Downloaded vulnerable components via git sparse-checkout (camel-coap, camel-mina, camel-infinispan)
3. Scan (/scan) — Automated vulnerability discovery across all 3 components
4. Understand (/understand --map) — Attack surface mapping: entry points, trust boundaries, sinks, unchecked data flows
5. Validate (/validate) — Full 8-stage exploitability validation pipeline (Stages 0 → A → B → C → D → E → F → 1) confirming all 3 findings are real, reachable, and exploitable
6. Exploit (/exploit) — Working PoC development with Docker-based testing environment
7. Documentation — Screenshots, exploit report, and this README

Fixes

Disclaimer

This research is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. All exploits were tested against locally-built Docker containers running vulnerable software. Upgrade to the fixed versions listed above.