catforgor/cve-2026-51585rt26cx21x64.sys exploit (Realtek PCIe GbE/2.5GbE/5GbE family)
rt26cx21x64.sys exploit (Realtek PCIe GbE/2.5GbE/5GbE family)
OID 0xFF816871 maps the nic's mmio bar into the calling proc's virtual addr space, (MmLockedPagesSpecifyCache), reachable from um via \.\RealTekCard{GUID}
This IOCTL (0x0012C818) is gated by a registry value (DrvMode=4)
Once we have mmio reg access, we program the nic's tx/rx descriptor rings in loopback mode to r/w arbitrary phys addrs (AllocateUserPhysicalPages gives us PFNs).
IOCTL 0x12C008 (1230872) is the first vulnerable dispatch branch. 0x12C00C and 0x12C010 lead to different paths, a5 carries the IOCTL code through the switch
Before reaching the DMA path, the drv checks a global DrvMode flag, bit 2 must be set or we will never reach the vuln MMIO mapping path.
dword_1400D0208 and 4 is the check
Two guards sit in front of the vuln path both must eval to false to get into to the DMA path, these are a byte flag on the device extension and the mode check in the previous image
!_(_BYTE _)(a1 + 12465) is easy to bypass, we just have to make sure the device isnt initialized.
sub_14001B67C is also trivially easy.
The driver allocates an MDL over a caller supplied phys addr with no validation, there is no bounds or range validation, like nothing at all.
The MDL is mapped into the kernel VA and the base address is given to the caller, 0x40000010 is MAP_NO_EXECUTE & MmNonCached.
MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache produces the mapped VA which is written to *a2 and returned to um, this gives us a arbitrary phys r/w prim.
nic.h.Run as admin.
After first run, reg vals will be set and you will need to restart your pc.
For this to work, your NIC must be in a link UP state (so we can process descriptors).
Either:
OR
$ cmake -B build
$ cmake --build build --config Release