
Android arm64 kernel LPE exploit for CVE-2026-43499 using KASLR leak and pipe_phys arbitrary kernel R/W, plus su/KernelSU integration for iQOO devices.
Android arm64 kernel-level local privilege escalation chain adapted from IonStack research by Nebula Security
iQOO Neo11 (PD2520) | SM8750 | Snapdragon 8 Elite | Android 16
For educational / security research purposes only. Run this on devices you own or are authorized to test. This is a real kernel exploit: misuse may cause a kernel panic or damage the device.
pselect race primitive (perf sampling yields an incorrect base address on this target and causes a panic, so it is disabled).pipe_phys primitive (pipe_read64 / pipe_write64 / pipe_phys_read_data / pipe_phys_write_data).vr.ko anti-detection bypass: vivo's anti-root module kills any process that becomes uid 0; this chain redirects its sys_exit probe to a no-op and clears the per-task flag.target.h offset table from the corresponding device's boot.img.This project is based on the original PoC of IonStack / CVE-2026-43499 from Nebula Security, with adaptations and enhancements to address a series of practical issues on vivo/iQOO devices (iQOO Neo11 / PD2520). The main changes are as follows:
su command being unable to connect: in the original version, after privilege escalation on vivo devices, su could not be connected to by shell clients because the self-developed daemon ran in u:r:kernel:s0 (kernel domain) (su: connect daemon: Permission denied). It now prefers KernelSU's /system/bin/su and cleans up the self-developed leftovers on /apex/com.android.virt/bin/su, so su works normally.kernelsu.ko version does not match and cannot be loaded (see the note below), root persistence across soft reboots is not actually achieved—after a soft reboot, privilege escalation still needs to be triggered again./apex/com.android.virt/bin and writes its self-developed su there; after a soft reboot, the leftover tmpfs masks the real APEX mount, preventing zygote / system_server from starting (black screen). It now prefers KernelSU and only mounts tmpfs as a fallback, and cleans up stale tmpfs leftovers before running.install_kernel_su) — not yet implemented / cannot take effect. The code logic is: after privilege escalation, detect /data/local/tmp/kernelsu.ko, and if not loaded, automatically insmod it, then verify /proc/modules and /dev/ksu. But in reality this cannot be achieved: kernelsu.ko must exactly match the running kernel's vermagic to load, and the ko bundled in the repository is compiled for the 6.6.127 kernel, so it cannot be loaded on the target device's 6.6.89 kernel; insmod directly reports ENOENT (insmod: failed to load ... No such file or directory). Therefore root persistence (surviving soft reboots) has not truly been achieved. To make it work, you must first obtain a kernelsu.ko that exactly matches the target kernel and replace /data/local/tmp/kernelsu.ko.install_boot_service): writes the boot script to /data/adb/service.d/10-neo11-su.sh, and after a soft reboot KernelSU attempts to automatically reload the LKM / restore root. Note: the script itself installs correctly, but its core action (insmod kernelsu.ko) is limited by the ko version mismatch described above; the script will only log "lkm load failed" and cannot truly persist root.try_forward_kernelsu): the custom su client, upon detecting /system/bin/su, forwards directly instead of connecting to an unreachable socket daemon.teardown_stale_su_tmpfs / cleanup_apex_su): identifies and unmounts the /apex tmpfs left over from the previous round, avoiding a black screen, and cleans up leftover binaries that hijack the su command.build.sh: builds directly with the Android NDK's clang (no GNU make required), simplifying the build process on Windows.llvm-objdumpaarch64-linux-android35make (GNU make; use MSYS2 UCRT64 on Windows) or the project's bundled build.shadbboot.img + profile_*.json (physical offset / kernel physical load address)CVE-2026-43499/
├── LICENSE # Apache-2.0
├── README.md
├── exploit/
│ ├── Makefile # GNU make 构建
│ ├── build.sh # 直接调用 NDK clang 构建(无需 make)
│ ├── 10-neo11-su.sh # KernelSU 开机服务脚本
│ ├── assets/wallpaper.webp # 内嵌示例壁纸
│ ├── build/ # 构建产物(preload.so、su_daemon)
│ └── src/
│ ├── main.c # 入口 / 线程路由
│ ├── preload.c # LD_PRELOAD 加载器、su/KernelSU/开机引导安装
│ ├── slide.c # KASLR 滑动地址泄漏
│ ├── pipe.c # pipe-phys 任意读写
│ ├── fops.c # 伪造 file_operations 构造
│ ├── root.c # cred / seccomp / vr.ko 补丁
│ ├── su_daemon.c # 独立 su 守护进程 + 客户端
│ └── targets/<PROJECT>/ # 各机型 target.h / root.c
└── poc/
└── poc.c # 最小化 PoC
Configure the Android NDK (or set ANDROID_NDK_HOME):
# GNU make(自动生成或选择目标)
make PROJECT=PD2520-BP2A.250605.031.A3 clean preload
# 或使用自带的脚本(无需 make)
ANDROID_NDK_HOME=/path/to/ndk bash build.sh
Build artifacts:
build/PD2520-BP2A.250605.031.A3/bin/preload.sobuild/embed/su_daemon_aarch64_pieTo adapt this to another device model, first generate target.h from that model's boot.img (see list-projects in exploit/Makefile), then build with the corresponding PROJECT.
Push the files and trigger the exploit through adb:
adb push build/PD2520-BP2A.250605.031.A3/bin/preload.so /data/local/tmp/preload.so
adb shell "LD_PRELOAD=/data/local/tmp/preload.so /system/bin/true"
Verify root:
adb shell su -c id
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) context=u:r:ksu:s0
On vivo/iQOO devices, this chain also neutralizes vr.ko, so the su process is not silently killed.