
IaC threat modeler with STRIDE, MITRE ATT&CK, and PASTA frameworks. REST API, GraphQL, and Docker support for Terraform, CloudFormation, and Kubernetes.
Static IaC threat modeler that parses Terraform, CloudFormation, and Kubernetes manifests and produces structured threat model reports using STRIDE, MITRE ATT&CK, or PASTA frameworks. No network calls, no cloud credentials, fully offline. Runs as a CLI, REST API, or containerized service.
CLI:
pip install threatmap
threatmap scan ./examples --output report.md --fail-on HIGH
Docker:
docker run -v $(pwd):/workspace bogdynn/threatmap:2.1.0 threatmap scan /workspace --output /workspace/report.md
REST API Server:
threatmap serve --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
# Or via Docker:
docker run -p 8000:8000 bogdynn/threatmap:2.1.0
# API endpoints: /health, /version, /rules, /analyze
GraphQL API:
docker run -p 8000:8000 bogdynn/threatmap:2.1.0
# GraphQL endpoint: http://localhost:8000/graphql
# Queries: health, version, rules
# Mutations: analyze(content, filename, framework)
| Format | Provider | Extension |
|---|---|---|
| Terraform HCL | AWS, Azure, GCP | .tf |
| CloudFormation | AWS | .yaml, .yml, .json |
| Kubernetes manifests | Kubernetes | .yaml, .yml |
Install from PyPI:
pip install threatmap
Or for local development:
git clone https://github.com/bogdanticu88/threatmap.git
cd threatmap
pip install -e .
Scan a directory and print a Markdown report to stdout:
threatmap scan ./terraform/
Scan multiple paths and write a JSON report to a file:
threatmap scan ./terraform/ ./k8s/ ./cloudformation/ --format json --output report.json
Generate an interactive HTML report or a SARIF report for GitHub Security:
threatmap scan ./infra/ --format html --output report.html
threatmap scan ./infra/ --format sarif --output report.sarif
CI gate — exit code 1 if any CRITICAL or HIGH threat is found:
threatmap scan ./infra/ --fail-on HIGH --output threat-report.md
Print a terminal summary table only, without writing a full report:
threatmap scan ./infra/ --summary
Use ASCII-only severity indicators (no emojis) for environments that don't support Unicode:
threatmap scan ./infra/ --ascii --output report.md
Analyze using different threat modeling frameworks:
# STRIDE (default)
threatmap scan ./infra/ --framework stride
# MITRE ATT&CK (maps to tactics and techniques)
threatmap scan ./infra/ --framework mitre --format json
# PASTA (asset-centric threat modeling)
threatmap scan ./infra/ --framework pasta --format json
STRIDE (73 rules)
MITRE ATT&CK (11 rules, 14 tactics)
PASTA (12 rules, asset-centric)
Running threatmap scan ./examples --output report.md against the bundled examples produces a full Markdown report. Below is a representative excerpt.
| ID | Severity | STRIDE Category | Resource | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-001 | 🔴 CRITICAL | Information Disclosure | AuditBucket | S3 bucket 'AuditBucket' has no public access block configured — bucket may be publicly accessible. |
| T-002 | 🔴 CRITICAL | Spoofing | WebSecurityGroup | Security group 'WebSecurityGroup' exposes SSH/RDP (port 22/3389) to 0.0.0.0/0. |
| T-003 | 🔴 CRITICAL | Elevation of Privilege | app_contributor | Role assignment 'app_contributor' grants the privileged role 'Contributor'. |
| T-006 | 🟠 HIGH | Information Disclosure | AuditBucket | S3 bucket 'AuditBucket' does not have server-side encryption configured. |
| T-008 | 🟠 HIGH | Elevation of Privilege | api | Container 'api' in Deployment 'api' may run as root (no runAsNonRoot=true or runAsUser=0). |
| T-011 | 🟠 HIGH | Elevation of Privilege | web | EC2 instance 'web' allows IMDSv1 — metadata service accessible without session tokens, enabling SSRF-based credential theft. |
### T-002 — Spoofing (CRITICAL)
Resource: AWS::EC2::SecurityGroup.WebSecurityGroup
Property: ingress.ssh_rdp_open
Finding: Security group 'WebSecurityGroup' exposes SSH/RDP (port 22/3389) to 0.0.0.0/0.
Mitigation: Remove public SSH/RDP access. Use AWS Systems Manager Session Manager
or a bastion host with IP restrictions.
The report appends a Mermaid flowchart LR diagram. Nodes are coloured by worst-case severity (🔴 red = CRITICAL, 🟠 orange = HIGH). Paste the block into any Mermaid renderer or view it directly on GitHub.
flowchart LR
Internet((Internet))
subgraph Networking
aws_security_group_web_sg{web_sg}
NetworkPolicy_default_deny{default-deny}
azurerm_network_security_group_app_nsg{app_nsg}
end
subgraph Compute
aws_instance_web[web]
end
subgraph Kubernetes
Namespace_myapp[myapp]
Deployment_api[api]
Service_api_svc[api-svc]
Ingress_api_ingress[api-ingress]
end
subgraph Data
aws_s3_bucket_app_data[(app_data)]
aws_db_instance_app_db[(app_db)]
azurerm_storage_account_app_storage[(app_storage)]
end
subgraph Security
azurerm_key_vault_app_kv[app_kv]
end
subgraph Identity
azurerm_role_assignment_app_contributor[/app_contributor/]
end
AWS__S3__Bucket_AppBucket -->|ref| AWS__S3__Bucket_AuditBucket
AWS__CloudTrail__Trail_AppTrail -->|ref| AWS__S3__Bucket_AuditBucket
Internet -->|HTTPS| Ingress_api_ingress
style aws_security_group_web_sg fill:#ff4444,color:#fff
style aws_s3_bucket_app_data fill:#ff4444,color:#fff
style aws_instance_web fill:#ff8800,color:#fff
style Deployment_api fill:#ff8800,color:#fff
style azurerm_key_vault_app_kv fill:#ffcc00,color:#000
style azurerm_network_security_group_app_nsg fill:#ff8800,color:#fff
style azurerm_role_assignment_app_contributor fill:#ff4444,color:#fffthreatmap now includes Graph Intelligence that traces relationships between resources. It automatically identifies "chained" threats where a compromise of one resource (e.g., an internet-exposed EC2) leads directly to another (e.g., a private S3 bucket), flagging these as Elevation of Privilege attack paths.
You can define internal security requirements by creating a threatmap_rules.yaml in your project root.
rules:
- resource_type: "aws_s3_bucket"
property: "force_destroy"
expected: false
stride: "Tampering"
severity: "MEDIUM"
description: "Production buckets should not have force_destroy enabled."
mitigation: "Set force_destroy = false."
Most findings now include a remediation field (visible in JSON, HTML, and SARIF reports) that provides the exact code snippet needed to fix the security issue.
STRIDE Analyzer — Provider-specific threat rules:
threatmap/analyzers/
├── aws.py # 22 rules — S3, IAM, EC2, RDS, EKS, CloudTrail, KMS, Lambda
├── azure.py # 19 rules — Storage, Key Vault, NSG, RBAC, AKS, ACR, SQL
├── gcp.py # 15 rules — GCS, Firewall, Compute, Cloud SQL, GKE, IAM, KMS
└── kubernetes.py # 17 rules — workloads, RBAC, network, secrets
MITRE ATT&CK Analyzer — 11 rules mapped to MITRE tactics:
PASTA Analyzer — 12 rules with asset-centric focus:
APIs:
/health, /version, /rules, /analyze, /analyze/file/graphql with Query (health, version, rules) and Mutation (analyze)Each rule is a function that receives a Resource object (normalised from whatever source format was parsed) and returns a Threat if the condition is met. Rules are plain Python conditionals — no DSL, no regex engine, no external ruleset files.
Severity reflects both exploitability and blast radius:
| Severity | Meaning |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Directly exploitable with no additional preconditions (e.g. SSH open to 0.0.0.0/0, wildcard IAM policy, cluster-admin binding to anonymous) |
| HIGH | Significant risk requiring one additional step (e.g. unencrypted RDS with public access, IMDSv1 on an EC2 instance) |
| MEDIUM | Defence-in-depth controls missing — lower immediate risk but violates security baselines (e.g. no versioning, no logging, no resource limits) |
| LOW | Best-practice gaps with limited standalone exploitability (e.g. Lambda not in VPC) |
publicly_accessible = true, Principal: "*").metadata_options block on an EC2 instance means IMDSv1 is active, because that is AWS's default).(stride_category, resource_name, trigger_property) so the same logical issue is never reported twice even if it appears across multiple file formats.# .github/workflows/threat-model.yml
name: Threat Model
on: [pull_request]
jobs:
threatmap:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.11"
- name: Install threatmap
run: pip install threatmap
- name: Run threat model scan
run: |
threatmap scan ./infra/ \
--format markdown \
--output threat-report.md \
--fail-on HIGH
- name: Upload threat report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: threat-report
path: threat-report.md
The --fail-on HIGH flag makes the job exit with code 1 if any HIGH or CRITICAL threat is found, blocking the PR merge. The uploaded artifact gives reviewers the full report without leaving the pull request.
| Provider | Rules |
|---|---|
| AWS (Terraform + CloudFormation) | 22 |
| Azure (Terraform) | 19 |
| GCP (Terraform) | 15 |
| Kubernetes | 17 |
| Total | 73 |
Categories covered per provider:
| Provider | S | T | R | I | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AWS | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Azure | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | — | ✓ |
| GCP | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | — | ✓ |
| Kubernetes | ✓ | ✓ | — | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
(S=Spoofing, T=Tampering, R=Repudiation, I=Information Disclosure, D=Denial of Service, E=Elevation of Privilege)
Run tests:
pytest tests/ -v
Run with coverage:
pytest tests/ --cov=threatmap --cov-report=term-missing
threatmap/analyzers/<provider>.py following the existing patterntests/fixtures/ that triggers the new ruletests/test_analyzers.py