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loom-mcp-userkey-follow — A Loom MCP admin in one group can move a connector to a new host. The admin key is deleted. Saved per-user API keys are not, and the next invoke sends them to that host. Same group only. v1.9.0 and v1.10.3. Medium 6.9. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/abraxas/loom-mcp-userkey-follow
Authentication & AuthorizationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationSecret DetectionLabs & Practice
GitHubabraxas/loom-mcp-userkey-follow

loom-mcp-userkey-follow

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A Loom MCP admin in one group can move a connector to a new host. The admin key is deleted. Saved per-user API keys are not, and the next invoke sends them to that host. Same group only. v1.9.0 and v1.10.3. Medium 6.9.

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1 day agoNot yet reviewed

Abraxas Labs - loom-mcp-userkey-follow

loom-mcp-userkey-follow

An MCP administrator in a group can change a connector's address. Loom deletes the connector's own admin key when that happens. It does not delete the per-user keys saved under the connector's name. The next invoke sends those keys to the new host.

Same group only. Putting the connector into another group's tag, or renaming it onto a name that group already uses, is refused. The lab stored one user's key and invoked as that same user. A second person's key is the same name pattern and was not a second captured header.

Class: Secret follows a URL change Reach: Remote. mcp:write on a connector the caller can already update. Another user's key is disclosed when that user invokes.

Loom v1.9.0 a3050669 and v1.10.3 cc10ab0

IDno CVE yet
ClassPer-user API key survives an endpoint move
ReachRemote, same loom:group
CWECWE-522
CVSSMedium: 6.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Productawslabs/loom
Affectedv1.9.0 a3050669f5b4c83210a44ed4346f17e01641e82f and v1.10.3 cc10ab08573087fa12154f7c8181ffcd985fea88
Authg-admins-demo (mcp:write) in the connector's group
LicenseGNU Affero GPL v3.0
Labloopback Docker on v1.9.0. v1.10.3 was a source check.

UI:R is the other person invoking later. The container invoked once, as the admin who had just stored the witness, to show the header.

What an attacker can do

PrivilegeMethod / sinkImpactLab-proven or inferred
Move endpoint_url and clear the admin keyPUT /api/mcp/servers/{id}Integrity. has_admin_api_key=false. The id-keyed admin secret is gone.Lab-proven
Keep the per-user secretuser_api_key_secret_name(name, sub) is loom/mcp/{name}/api-key/{sub}Confidentiality, still storedLab-proven. The witness was still in the secret store.
Send that secret to the new hostPOST /api/agents/{id}/invoke with connector_idsConfidentiality. Authorization: Bearer on the new host.Lab-proven for the caller's own stored key
Send someone else's key the same waythe same lookup, their subConfidentialityInferred. Same function, not a second capture.

Stays closed

AxisMethod / sinkWhy it is closed
ConfidentialityAdmin key on the new hostLab checked. The admin secret was absent and the admin value was not in the capture.
IntegrityCreate or rename into another group's name409
ConfidentialityMetadata and loopback fetchesguarded_post still refuses those. The lab oracle was an address the guard allows. RFC1918 is allowed on purpose.

How I found it

The admin secret was moved onto the server id so a rename could not aim it at another group. The per-user secret stayed on the display name, with a comment that the path is baked into agent config at deploy and that cross-group name collisions are refused. That closes the collision. It does not clear the key when the only thing that changed is the host.

The SUCCESS container was v1.9.0. user_api_key_secret_name on v1.10.3 is the same shape, and the endpoint move still does not delete that path.

Lab

python3 loom-mcp-userkey-follow-Abraxas-Labs.py
SUCCESS LOOM-190-MCP-USERKEY-FOLLOW user-key-followed endpoint-move LOOM-190-MCP-USERKEY-FOLLOW-WITNESS

run.sh checks out the public tag and tears the stack down.

The fix

On endpoint_url change, delete every loom/mcp/{name}/api-key/ secret for that connector, or key those secrets on the server id and stop writing the name into config. A comment that collisions are refused is not a clear.

References

  • awslabs/loom v1.10.3 cc10ab08573087fa12154f7c8181ffcd985fea88
  • services/mcp.py user_api_key_secret_name
  • CWE-522
  • CVSS 3.1 calculator

License

GNU Affero GPL v3.0. See LICENSE. Loopback lab only. No warranty.

Abraxas Labs [email protected]

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