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loom-idp-issuer-swap — A Loom security admin can change only the SSO issuer and keep a super-admin group mapping. Login then becomes super-admin, and an anonymous token call sends the stored client secret to the new issuer. v1.9.0 and v1.10.3. High 8.7. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/abraxas/loom-idp-issuer-swap
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingSecret DetectionIdentity & Access Management (IAM)AuthenticationLabs & Practice
GitHubabraxas/loom-idp-issuer-swap

loom-idp-issuer-swap

A Loom security admin can change only the SSO issuer and keep a super-admin group mapping. Login then becomes super-admin, and an anonymous token call sends the stored client secret to the new issuer. v1.9.0 and v1.10.3. High 8.7.

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Abraxas Labs - loom-idp-issuer-swap

loom-idp-issuer-swap

A security administrator who is allowed to edit single sign-on, and who is not a super-admin, can change only the issuer address. The old group mapping stays, including the mapping that means super-admin. The next login with a token from the new issuer is a super-admin. Separately, anyone on the network can ask Loom to trade a code for a token, and Loom sends the stored client secret to whatever token address that issuer now advertises.

The limit is real. The caller already holds security:write. A brand-new identity provider cannot be created with a super-admin mapping, and a save that tries to add that mapping is refused. The issuer has to be a public HTTPS address Loom's guard will fetch. This is not a request that reaches the cloud metadata address.

Class: Authentication mapping bypass, with the confidential client secret following the new token endpoint Reach: Remote. security:write (g-admins-security) for the issuer change. The token exchange itself is unauthenticated.

Loom v1.9.0 a3050669 and v1.10.3 cc10ab0

IDno CVE yet
ClassIssuer swap that keeps a super-admin mapping
ReachRemote (security:write, then an unauthenticated token call)
CWECWE-863 / CWE-522
CVSSHigh: 8.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Productawslabs/loom
Affectedv1.9.0 a3050669f5b4c83210a44ed4346f17e01641e82f and v1.10.3 cc10ab08573087fa12154f7c8181ffcd985fea88
Authg-admins-security for the save. Token exchange has no session.
LicenseGNU Affero GPL v3.0
Labloopback Docker. The container run was v1.9.0. v1.10.3 was a source check of the same functions.

What an attacker can do

PrivilegeMethod / sinkRecon / integrity / availability / confidentialityLab-proven or inferred
Read the live mapping table, client id, and whether a secret is storedGET /api/settings/identity-providersRecon. Not the secret string.Lab-proven as the setup the save depends on
Point JWKS and the token endpoint at an issuer they control, and leave the super-admin mapping in placePUT /api/settings/identity-providers/{id} with only issuer_urlIntegrityLab-proven. HTTP 200. Omitting group_mappings skips the scope check.
Log in as super-adminBearer login, RS256, claim equal to the preserved external groupIntegrityLab-proven. me-groups=t-admin,g-admins-super
Use admin:writea route that was 403 before the loginIntegrityLab-proven. admin-write=200, witness written
Have Loom POST the stored client secret to the new token endpointunauthenticated POST /api/auth/tokenConfidentialityLab-proven. client-secret-match=yes
Take the control plane offlinen/aAvailabilityNot shown. Availability is unscored.

Stays closed

AxisMethod / sinkWhy it is closed
IntegrityCreate an identity provider whose mapping is g-admins-super403. The scope check runs when mappings are present.
IntegrityPUT a mapping list that includes g-admins-super403
IntegrityEmpty mapping table, then loginNo groups. empty-map-super=no
ConfidentialityRead the identity provider's token responseOn v1.10.3 the body is logged and is not returned to the caller. The secret is still sent.

How I found it

update_identity_provider writes issuer_url on its own. set_group_mappings runs only when the field is not null. I expected "leave the field out" to mean "do not touch mappings," and that is what the code does, including a mapping the caller would be forbidden to set today. Discovery then replaces jwks_uri, authorization_endpoint, and token_endpoint. client_secret_arn is not in that update.

exchange_token is unauthenticated. If the row has a secret ARN, the handler loads it and posts it to token_endpoint. On v1.10.3 that response is no longer copied back to the caller. The post of the secret is unchanged.

The container that printed the SUCCESS line was v1.9.0 a3050669. I read the same two functions on v1.10.3 cc10ab0 and did not rebuild the container for that tag.

Lab

python3 loom-idp-issuer-swap-Abraxas-Labs.py

or cd lab && ./run.sh. run.sh checks out the public tag, checks the commit, and tears the stack down. Loopback only.

SUCCESS LOOM-190-IDP-ISSUER-SWAP empty-map-super=no issuer-put=200 me-groups=t-admin,g-admins-super admin-write=200 witness-written=yes client-secret-match=yes LOOM-190-IDP-ISSUER-SWAP-WITNESS

The fix

When issuer_url changes, re-check the mapping that is already stored, or clear it and require a new mapping list the caller is allowed to set. Clear or rotate client_secret_arn on that same change, the way an MCP URL move already clears a migrated OAuth secret. Do not post the secret until the issuer is the one an operator just confirmed.

References

  • awslabs/loom v1.10.3 cc10ab08573087fa12154f7c8181ffcd985fea88
  • identity_providers.py update_identity_provider
  • auth.py exchange_token
  • CWE-863 · CWE-522
  • CVSS 3.1 calculator

License

GNU Affero GPL v3.0. See LICENSE. Loopback lab only. No warranty.

Abraxas Labs [email protected]

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