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GitHubabraxas/cve-2026-13447

CVE-2026-13447

Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-13447, a critical authentication bypass in the WordPress MStore API plugin via forged Firebase JWT tokens, with a local lab reproduction.

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Abraxas Labs — CVE-2026-13447 — WordPress

abraxaslabs.tech  ·  github.com/abraxas  ·  @abraxas_null  ·  CVE-2026-13447

CVE-2026-13447 — WordPress

WordPress — MStore API 4.18.4 — inspireui

The Mstore Api plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via JWT Forgery in versions up to, and including, 4.20.0 This is due to missing cryptographic signature verification in the FirebasePhoneAuthHelper::verify_id_token() function, which decodes and validates Firebase ID token claims (alg, kid, aud, iss) but never calls openssl_verify() or any equivalent to validate the JWT signature against Google's actual public key certificates. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge a Firebase Phone Auth JWT signed with a self-generated RSA key pair and impersonate any phone number, resulting in unauthorized access to existing WordPress accounts or creation of new arbitrary accounts.

CVECVE-2026-13447 · CVE.org
CWECWE-287
CVSSCritical: 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
ProductWordPress — MStore API
Affectedall versions through 4.20.0 (lab 4.18.4; no 4.20.0 zip)
Patched4.21.1 and later
Authnone (see source map)
LicenseGNU Affero GPL v3.0
Lab127.0.0.1 only · vendor/client disclosure pack, not a scanner

Advisory (from the source map)

verify_id_token is the sink. HTTP is POST firebase_sms_v2 with JSON id_token, not a query param named verify_id_token.


Entry

  • Method: POST
  • Path: /wp-json/api/flutter_user/firebase_sms_v2
  • Router: POST /wp-json/api/flutter_user/firebase_sms_v2 (also /?rest_route=/api/flutter_user/firebase_sms_v2). FlutterUserController permission_callback isPurchaseCodeVerified always true. firebase_sms_verify_id_token reads php://input id_token. FirebasePhoneAuthHelper::verify_id_token checks alg, kid in Google key list, aud/iss from uploaded firebase json, returns phone_number. firebase_sms_login_v2 looks up registered_phone_number and returns generateCookieByUserId. 4.21.1 adds signature verify.
  • Notes: CVE-2026-13447 CWE-287 MStore API 4.18.4 (NVD through 4.20.0; no 4.20.0 zip). Witness POCWitness13447 in JSON. Not a reverse shell.

Call chain

  • GET Google x509 metadata, pick a kid
  • Build unsigned-verify JWT RS256 kid=that, aud=poc13447, iss=https://securetoken.google.com/poc13447, phone_number=+15551213447
  • POST /wp-json/api/flutter_user/firebase_sms_v2 {id_token}
  • verify_id_token skips openssl_verify, returns +15551213447
  • firebase_sms_login_v2 get_users registered_phone_number=that phone -> user 1
  • JSON cookie + displayname POCWitness13447

Lab preconditions

  • MStore API 4.18.4
  • uploads/flutter_firebase/poc13447.json project_id=poc13447, option mstore_firebase_file_name
  • admin registered_phone_number=+15551213447 display_name=POCWitness13447
  • lab host can GET Google x509 (kid must be in that list)

Witness

POST JSON body contains POCWitness13447 (admin displayname) and cookie. Generic 200 without that string is not it.

Not success

  • id_token is invalid
  • Firebase private key file is not found
  • User does not exist
  • 200 without POCWitness13447
  • reverse shell or outbound connect besides the Google kid fetch

Patch / remediation

Do this first: Update MStore API to 4.21.1 or newer.

Verify after upgrade

  • Re-run CVE-2026-13447-Abraxas-Labs.py against the patched build: the mapped witness must not appear.
  • Confirm the vendor advisory / changeset in the deployed tree (see references).
  • A WAF signature is delay, not a patch.

If you cannot update immediately

  • Disable or isolate the affected component.
  • Hunt for the witness condition on production (new privileged users, unexpected files, injected rows — whatever this CVE's map names).

Reproduction (authorized lab)

Target only http://127.0.0.1:8088 (or the loopback you bound). Do not point this script at the internet.

root@kitploit:~
python3 CVE-2026-13447-Abraxas-Labs.py

Success is the witness above in the response body. Generic 200 HTML is not it.


Lab images

Loopback stack used to reproduce. Official images unless a Dockerfile in this folder builds from source.

  • lab/docker-compose.yml
  • lab/docker-compose.override.yml
  • lab/Dockerfile
root@kitploit:~
cd lab
docker compose up --force-recreate

Bind the vulnerable product tree next to Compose if the YAML mounts a local directory (plugin zip / source tag from the version table). Publish nothing except 127.0.0.1.


References

  • CVE-2026-13447 · NVD

  • CVE-2026-13447 · CVE.org

  • plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.18.4/controllers/flutter-user.php#L829

  • plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.18.4/controllers/flutter-user.php#L940

  • plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.18.4/controllers/helpers/firebase-phone-auth-helper.php#L5

  • plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/flutter-user.php#L829

  • plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/flutter-user.php#L940

  • plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/helpers/firebase-phone-auth-helper.php#L5

  • www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4a1127af-74f6-4748-9aee-5a8c6c2766a4?source=cve

  • github.com/advisories/GHSA-6wfp-pwm3-667v

  • nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13447

  • Plugin directory: mstore-api

  • Trac browser: plugins.trac.wordpress.org/mstore-api

  • SVN tags: plugins.svn.wordpress.org/mstore-api

  • Abraxas Labs: abraxaslabs.tech · github.com/abraxas · @abraxas_null


Records (structured)

root@kitploit:~
# CVE-2026-13447  (structured records)

- input: `https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13447`
- CWE: CWE-287
- published: 2026-09-05T06:17:09.403

## NVD description

The Mstore Api plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via JWT Forgery in versions up to, and including, 4.20.0 This is due to missing cryptographic signature verification in the FirebasePhoneAuthHelper::verify_id_token() function, which decodes and validates Firebase ID token claims (alg, kid, aud, iss) but never calls openssl_verify() or any equivalent to validate the JWT signature against Google's actual public key certificates. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge a Firebase Phone Auth JWT signed with a self-generated RSA key pair and impersonate any phone number, resulting in unauthorized access to existing WordPress accounts or creation of new arbitrary accounts.

## MITRE description

The Mstore Api plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via JWT Forgery in versions up to, and including, 4.20.0 This is due to missing cryptographic signature verification in the FirebasePhoneAuthHelper::verify_id_token() function, which decodes and validates Firebase ID token claims (alg, kid, aud, iss) but never calls openssl_verify() or any equivalent to validate the JWT signature against Google's actual public key certificates. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge a Firebase Phone Auth JWT signed with a self-generated RSA key pair and impersonate any phone number, resulting in unauthorized access to existing WordPress accounts or creation of new arbitrary accounts.

## Affected

- inspireui MStore API – Create Native Android & iOS Apps On The Cloud 0 affected

## References (JSON sources only)

- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.18.4/controllers/flutter-user.php#L829
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.18.4/controllers/flutter-user.php#L940
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.18.4/controllers/helpers/firebase-phone-auth-helper.php#L5
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/flutter-user.php#L829
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/flutter-user.php#L940
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/helpers/firebase-phone-auth-helper.php#L5
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4a1127af-74f6-4748-9aee-5a8c6c2766a4?source=cve
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6wfp-pwm3-667v
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13447

## GitHub advisory

The Mstore Api plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via JWT Forgery in...

The Mstore Api plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via JWT Forgery in versions up to, and including, 4.20.0 This is due to missing cryptographic signature verification in the FirebasePhoneAuthHelper::verify_id_token() function, which decodes and validates Firebase ID token claims (alg, kid, aud, iss) but never calls openssl_verify() or any equivalent to validate the JWT signature against Google's actual public key certificates. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge a Firebase Phone Auth JWT signed with a self-generated RSA key pair and impersonate any phone number, resulting in unauthorized access to existing WordPress accounts or creation of new arbitrary accounts.

License

This disclosure pack is licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0. See LICENSE.


Disclaimer

This pack is for the vendor, the site owner, and licensed labs. The script talks to 127.0.0.1. Using it against systems you do not own is not authorized by Abraxas Labs. No warranty.

abraxaslabs.tech · github.com/abraxas · @abraxas_null

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