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N0xis — Reverse-engineering toolkit: disassembler, SSA decompiler, C++ class recovery and live-process analysis for PE and ELF. Scriptable CLI, every answer JSON. Source-available (PolyForm Noncommercial). | Kitploit
أدوات/GitHubGitHub/structio-labs/n0xis
Static AnalysisDynamic Analysis (Sandboxing)Memory ForensicsReverse EngineeringDebuggersMalware AnalysisUtilities & FrameworksBinary AnalysisAI-Assisted ReversingBinary Exploitation
GitHub
51124منذ 2 أياملم تتم المراجعة بعد
structio-labs/n0xis

N0xis

Reverse-engineering toolkit: disassembler, SSA decompiler, C++ class recovery and live-process analysis for PE and ELF. Scriptable CLI, every answer JSON. Source-available (PolyForm Noncommercial).

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N0xis

A reverse-engineering toolkit: disassembler, SSA decompiler, C++ class recovery and live-process analysis for PE and ELF. Static files and running processes go through one pipeline, and every answer is JSON a script can act on.

Three front ends share that core: the CLI, where a command answers with one JSON object (a serve session with a ready envelope, then one per request); a desktop GUI in its own repository, n0xis-gui; and an MCP server, n0xis-mcp — 27 tools returning the same envelope over JSON-RPC on stdio.

A live run: find a program's decrypted settings in its memory, watch them with a hardware watchpoint, and get the decompiled loop that wrote them

A real run of examples/config-demo: a program keeps its settings encrypted and decrypts them into memory; find the plaintext, arm a hardware watchpoint on it, and get the decompiled code that wrote it. Rerun it yourself with demo.sh.

$ n0xis provenance trace --pid 181529 --addr 0x564e32cb7060 --kind write
"instruction_va": "0x564e32cb4266",   // the byte store that wrote the watched address
"function_va": "0x564e32cb4230",      // the function it sits in, on this build (see below)
"decompiled_context": [
  "rcx.3 = (uint32_t)((uint32_t)(uint32_t)*(uint8_t*)((rsi.1 + v2)) ^ (uint32_t)v1);",
  "*(uint8_t*)((rdi.1 + v2)) = (uint8_t)rcx.3;",   // ← the write
  "rcx.4 = (uint32_t)(v1 + (v1 * 0x2));",
  "v2 = (v2 + 0x1);",
  "v1 = (uint32_t)((v1 + (rcx.4 * 0x4)) + 0x7);"
]

In the source this is config[i] = sealed[i] ^ key; key = key * 13 + 7;: the two statements rcx.4 = v1 + v1 * 2 and v1 = v1 + rcx.4 * 4 + 7 together are v1 * 13 + 7. The answer gives addresses, not the names config and decrypt_config: names from the binary's symbols are not carried into it yet. This build is gcc -O2, where function_va is the function's start; on clang -O2 and gcc -O1 builds of the same source it is the loop head, answered ok:true with no note. This run is on Linux; the last Windows run of provenance trace is in the ledger.

What runs where

yes: every check agreed · partial: usable, with the gaps below · wrong: ok:true with wrong results on measured inputs · refused: a typed error · not yet: no code path. Measured in October 2026 on programs built from known source, against the processor and independent tools.

FormatStatic fileLive process
PE32+, PE32 (x86-64, x86, ARM64)partial: the gaps and wrong answers belowWindows: not measured for this table
ELF64, ELF32 (x86-64, x86, AArch64, ARMv7)partial: the gaps and wrong answers below; big-endian: decompile and RTTI refusedLinux x86-64: partial: the live entries below; other ISAs not measured
Mach-O, thin and universalrefused (load-failed)not yet
WebAssemblypartial: the function list, disassembly, calls to and from a function, imports, exports, profile and strings (with each string's place in linear memory) agreed with wasm-objdump on every module measured; decompile, IR and the other commands that need the lift refused (not-lifted: the lift is stage 3)not yet
Raw bytes (--bytes)disassemble, cross-references, strings with a range; discover and decompile partial; profile and rtti scan refused—
ISADisassembleDiscover functionsDecompile
x86-64yesyes with unwind tables; partial withoutpartial
x86 (i386)yespartial: even with .eh_frame, GCC's padding and .plt listed as functions, dots in names rewritten, an end missingpartial
AArch64, little- and big-endianyesyes with .eh_frame, little- and big-endian; partial without; on PE --pdata is wrongpartial; big-endian refused
ARMv7 A32partial: no NEON, data in code decoded as codepartialwrong: jump tables, tail calls
ARMv7 Thumb-2 (--arch thumb)wrong: branch targets, IT conditionspartial: no names or endswrong: an IT-predicated return ends the function
WebAssemblyyes; a branch's target is a label depth, not given until stage 3yes: every body, its extent, index and namerefused (stage 3)
  • Wrong with ok:true: Itanium RTTI in a MinGW PE (reported absent), --pdata on ARM64 PE, long MinGW section names in profile (/4), the export list of an ELF shared object and the .localalias names it gives that object's functions, GCC's i386 padding and .plt block listed as functions, dots in symbol names printed as underscores (__x86_get_pc_thunk_bx for __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx), and big-endian AArch64 discovery missing functions its .eh_frame declares. The decompiler drops pass-through arguments, can read a register it never assigns, on AArch64 can name the wrong string, and on 32-bit x86 loses stack arguments and the high half of 64-bit results. The countdown loop on A32 and AArch64 is printed in full now, which was checked on bytes and not yet on a processor. Its quality field counts what a body leaves unsaid; 1.0 is not a statement that the body is right. The full list, with counts, is in the ledger.
  • Missed, answered ok with less: without unwind tables, functions reached only through vtables, the MSVC-ABI entry point and most of an ELF shared object; references held in absolute immediates, AArch64 adrp+add or adr, or the i386 GOT; Itanium secondary vtables, and every Itanium class of a stripped image; names that only the COFF symbol table holds. A PDB beside an x64 PE gave every start, name and end on the two lld-link images measured (35 of 35, 18 of 18).
  • Live (Linux): provenance trace prints a written address as a string literal when the bytes there happen to be printable, and on some builds names the loop head as the function (above); scan dissect guesses field types; Windows-only commands refuse elsewhere.

Install

Prebuilt binaries for Linux and Windows, the MCP server and sha256sums.txt: latest release.

curl -LO https://github.com/Structio-labs/N0xis/releases/latest/download/n0xis-linux-x86_64
curl -LO https://github.com/Structio-labs/N0xis/releases/latest/download/sha256sums.txt
sha256sum -c --ignore-missing sha256sums.txt
chmod +x n0xis-linux-x86_64 && mv n0xis-linux-x86_64 n0xis && ./n0xis --version

Or build it with stable Rust, on Linux or Windows: cargo build --workspace --release. rust-toolchain.toml pins the channel only, and says how to build on Windows without the MSVC Build Tools.

Updates

n0x update installs a newer release, n0x update --check only asks, and n0x update --rollback goes back for this binary. A download is checked against a signed manifest before anything moves.

The tool never replaces itself unasked, and never prompts. In a terminal, at most once a day, it prints one line on standard error, such as [n0x] 0.3.7 is available: n0x update. That daily check is the only request the tool makes on its own, and it carries nothing about what is being analysed. It runs only when standard error is a terminal, so a script, a pipe, 2>&1, CI and a scheduler make no request and get no line. --quiet silences the line anywhere. Turn the check off with n0x config set update.check false or N0X_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1. To install without being asked, n0x config set update.auto true.

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