[SSLsplit] Transparent and scalable SSL/TLS interception
SSLsplit is a tool for man-in-the-middle
attacks against SSL/TLS encrypted network connections. Connections are
transparently intercepted through a network address translation engine
and redirected to SSLsplit. SSLsplit terminates SSL/TLS and initiates a
new SSL/TLS connection to the original destination address, while
logging all data transmitted.
SSLsplit is intended to be useful for network forensics and penetration testing.
SSLsplit supports plain TCP, plain SSL, HTTP and HTTPS connections
over both IPv4 and IPv6. For SSL and HTTPS connections, SSLsplit
generates and signs forged X509v3 certificates on-the-fly, based on the
original server certificate subject DN and subjectAltName extension.
SSLsplit fully supports Server Name Indication (SNI) and is able to work
with RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys and DHE and ECDHE cipher suites. SSLsplit
can also use existing certificates of which the private key is
available, instead of generating forged ones. SSLsplit supports
NULL-prefix CN certificates and can deny OCSP requests in a generic way.
SSLsplit removes HPKP response headers in order to prevent public key pinning.
Requirements
- SSLsplit depends on the OpenSSL and libevent 2.x libraries.
- The build depends on GNU make and a POSIX.2 environment in `PATH`.
- The optional unit tests depend on the check library.
SSLsplit currently supports the following operating systems and NAT mechanisms:
- FreeBSD: pf rdr and divert-to, ipfw fwd, ipfilter rdr
- OpenBSD: pf rdr-to and divert-to
- Linux: netfilter REDIRECT and TPROXY
- Mac OS X: ipfw fwd and pf rdr (experimental)
[SSLsplit] Transparent and scalable SSL/TLS interception
Reviewed by Zion3R
on
4:52 PM
Rating: