This tool implements a userland exploit that was initially discussed by James Forshaw (a.k.a. @tiraniddo) - in this blog post - for dumping the memory of any PPL as an administrator.

I wrote two blog posts about this tool. The first part is about Protected Processes concepts while the second one dicusses the bypass technique itself.

• Blog post part #1: Do You Really Know About LSA Protection (RunAsPPL)?
• Blog post part #2: Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland

Simply run the executable without any argument and you will get a detailed help/usage.

c:\Temp>PPLdump64.exe
 _____ _____ __      _
|  _  |  _  |  |   _| |_ _ _____ ___
|   __|   __|  |__| . | | |     | . |  version 0.4
|__|  |__|  |_____|___|___|_|_|_|  _|  by @itm4n
                                |_|

Description:
  Dump the memory of a Protected Process Light (PPL) with a *userland* exploit

Usage:
  PPLdump.exe [-v] [-d] [-f] <PROC_NAME|PROC_ID> <DUMP_FILE>

Arguments:
  PROC_NAME  The name of a Process to dump
  PROC_ID    The ID of a Process to dump
  DUMP_FILE  The path of the output dump file

Options:
  -v         (Verbose) Enable verbose mode
  -d         (Debug) Enable debug mode (implies verbose)
  -f         (Force) Bypass DefineDosDevice error check

Examples:
  PPLdump.exe lsass.exe lsass.dmp
  PPLdump.exe -v 720 out.dmp

First of all, PPLs were introduced with Windows 8.1 so older versions of Windows are obviously not supported. This project mainly targets Windows 10 (and its server editions) but I also tested it on older versions. You will find a summary table of the tests I did in the eponymous section.

Other PPL bypass tools usually execute arbitrary code in the Kernel through a digitally signed driver. This one is different as it involves only userland tricks and is (almost) fileless.

This tool leverages a very clever trick that was initially discussed by James Forshaw in 2018 (see Credits). It involves the use of the DefineDosDevice API function to trick the system into creating an arbitrary Known DLL entry. Since PPLs do not check the digital signature of Known DLLs, this can be later used to perform a DLL hijacking attack and execute arbitrary code inside a PPL.

Although this tool performs a DLL hijacking attack as a second stage, it does not create a new DLL file on disk. Instead, it makes use of an NTFS transaction to virtually replace the content of an existing one, a technique directly inspired by the work of @_ForrestOrr (see Credits).

Ths short answer is "no". First, it does not involve any direct Kernel access so there is no risk of causing a BSOD from this standpoint. In the worst case scenario, the tool might fail to remove the created Known DLL entry but, this will not cause a Denial of Service. It will just stay there until the next machine reboot. As the created entry would just be a symbolic link pointing to a non-existent section, the system would eventually fall back to the default location (i.e. the System32 folder) so it will not impact other programs running on the machine.

[-] DefineDosDevice failed with error code 6 - The handle is invalid.

This Visual Studio Solution comprises two projects (the executable and a payload DLL) that need to be compiled in a specific order. Everything is pre-configured, so you just have to follow these simple instructions. The compiled payload DLL is automatically embedded into the final executable.

1. Open the Solution with Visual Studio 2019.
2. Select Release / x64 or Release / x86 depending on the architecture of the target machine.
3. Build > Build Solution.

On Windows 8.1 / Server 2012 R2, you might have to compile the binary statically.

1. Right-click on the PPLdump project.
2. Go to Configuration Properties > C/C++ > Code Generation.
3. Select Multi-threaded (/MT) as the Runtime Library option.
4. Build the Solution.

• @tiraniddo - Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary Object Directory Creation for Local Elevation of Privilege
  https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/08/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
• @_ForrestOrr - Masking Malicious Memory Artifacts – Part I: Phantom DLL Hollowing
  https://www.forrest-orr.net/post/malicious-memory-artifacts-part-i-dll-hollowing